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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores empirically how external factors can influence the organizational
structure of firms and how the structure a firm chooses can affect worker outcomes.
The first chapter examines how a policy reform affected the organizational choices of firms.
The MINER Act of 2006 resulted in increased scrutiny and penalties for underground
coal mining operations relative to surface operations. In turn, this changed the incentives
for coal preparation facilities to own these mines. Particularly, markets most affected by
the reform saw an increase in ownership along an extensive margin and markets already
integrated saw a decrease along an intensive margin. I argue these results reflect the
competing incentives created by the policy. The increased riskiness of shut downs and
flows in production resulted in preparation plants integrating with at least one mine to
assure a basic level of supply. The increased regulatory liability of ownership induced by
the new regulatory structure resulted in a countervailing force, reducing the intensity of
integration in markets that were integrated prior to the reform.
The second chapter (with David Weil) studies the prevalence of contractor utilization in
the mining industry. Outsourcing of tasks has increased significantly in the underground
v
coal mining industry over the last two decades. We hypothesize that the market and orga-
nizational incentives facing contractors increase the likelihood of injuries and fatalities to
their workforce. Our results suggest increased risk exposure for mines with high contractor
utilization. These findings have important implications for enforcement and public policies
and extend the evidence of the adverse impact of forms of subcontracting on health and
safety to the mining sector.
Finally, the third chapter provides a case study of two major actors in the industry, Alpha
Natural Resources and Massey Energy Company. It looks at the ownership choices the two
companies have made in the past decade. Looking at these different decisions allows for
the identification of contract operations that are of concern from a regulatory standpoint
in this industry. This paper provides a blueprint for future research in determining the
prevalence of these particular contracting arrangements in US coal mining.
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Chapter 1
Vertical Integration and Regulation in US Coal
Production
21.1 Introduction
Why does a firm own its input suppliers? Organizational economics offers a number of ex-
planations stemming from contractual incompleteness; ownership of one entity by another
can ameliorate inefficiencies that arise when contracts cannot fully define the relationship
between the two. The theoretical underpinning of the literature emphasizes the interaction
of a firm’s internal and largely technological features with incentives.1 Although the role of
asset specificity and technological complexity are important to determining the relationship
between constituents in a supply chain, external factors can also interact with these inter-
nal features. The work considering this question focuses on changes to market conditions
but the role of government and policy interventions remains largely unexplored.2 This
paper studies how a regulation unrelated to the organizational structure of an industry,
specifically a health and safety reform, affects the vertical integration choice.
I exploit an unanticipated change to health and safety rules in the US coal mining industry
to measure how a law aimed at worker outcomes can have an effect on organizational struc-
ture. The particular setting concerns the ownership choices of coal preparation facilities
and mines.3 The preparation plants clean and size raw ore from mines and serve as dis-
patchers of the coal to its final destination. A preparation plant can choose to own mines
in its vicinity, contract with operations or pay a spot market price. The coal industry is
quite competitive yet there is substantial heterogeneity in ownership choices within and
across these local supply markets.4
1Examples of such internal features include the complexity of the production process, asset specificity,
complementarity of assets and adaptation requirements.
2A couple of papers have examined how pecuniary motives can impact integration (McLaren, 2000;
Legros and Newman, 2013; Legros and Newman, 2008). Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) discuss the role
deregulation may have played in the changes to corporate governance seen in the 80’s and 90’s.
3Joskow’s seminal paper on coal examined the organizational choices of electricity producer and mines.
Today, vertical integration of electricity plants and coal mines is quite uncommon. An analysis of EIA
Form 923 from the past 4 years indicates little overlap in company ownership and one is hard pressed to
find examples of collocated mines and electricity producers (Joskow, 1985). Those that are integrated exist
predominantly in the western US.
4For this reason I don’t consider market based arguments for vertical integrations such as foreclosure
and double marginalization (Tirole, 1988; Rey and Tirole, 2007).
3The regulatory change I consider is the MINER Act of 2006 which was enacted in response
to public and political concerns over the Sago mining disaster. The number of miners who
died in the accident was not large by historical standards, but the nature of the accident
and the public involvement in the unfolding drama were sufficient to motivate lawmakers to
change the regulatory environment. The reforms implemented by the legislation raised the
regulatory oversight for underground mining operations relative to surface mines. Using
historical characteristics that determine the type of mining suitable for a given location, I
construct control and treatment markets to study the impact of the law on vertical inte-
gration. The measures of integration are created from administrative records on ownership
and GPS coordinates available through the Mine Safety and Health Administration.
Why would a regulation designed to effect the safety of miners have a substantial impact on
the ownership choices of preparation plants and mines in the US coal market? Although this
may seem a surprising result, the reform changed ownership incentives along two different
dimensions. First, the regulation affected the ability of preparation plants to assure supply.
It made the likelihood of shut downs (both permanent and temporary) greater and the
increased oversight hindered mine production. Ownership of at least one supplying mine
gives the preparation plant operator greater control of their production process. However,
the reform also made it more costly for a single entity to operate many mines. This aspect
of the reform should create a disincentive to integrate. To disentangle these competing
incentives, I examine ownership choice across different measures of integration.
The empirical analysis indicates that preparation plants were more likely to own at least
one mine in their local market following the implementation of the reform. The impact
is statistically significant and represents most of the increase in this measure seen over
the time period of interest, 2005 to 2007. It is also robust to a number of specifications.
In contrast, the integration measures that capture the intensity of integration of a local
market change little overall and decrease in response to the reform among markets already
integrated. These result suggest that supply assurance motives increased integration along
4an extensive margin but that concerns over liability made ownership less likely once a basic
level of supply was assured.
Although I can’t definitively prove the above mechanisms, I can rule out other plausible
stories. Particularly, the exit of mines following the reform does not result in a shift of
the terms of trade. A nice corollary from a policy perspective is that the mines exiting
following the reform appear to be some of the most dangerous. Thus, the shifting market
structure appears to have improved miner health and safety.
The paper proceeds in the following manner: Section 1.2 discusses where this paper fits
within the current literature. Section 1.3 provides an overview of the mining industry.
Section 1.4 details the different data sources brought together for this analysis and the
construction of the measures of interest. Section 1.5 provides the results as well as a number
of robustness checks. I discuss these results and the potential motives for integration
created by the reform in Section 1.6 and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature
There is limited empirical work on the effect of regulatory intervention on vertical integra-
tion.5 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) discuss how financial deregulation played a role in
the change of corporate governance structure in the 80’s and 90’s. They argue that the rise
in shareholder value observed in those decades was a function of widespread deregulation
across a number of sectors and improved technology. Deregulation allowed for increased
market opportunities, which reduced hold-up inefficiencies and thus the need for hierarchal
structures. This permanent structural change resulted in markets being better equipped
to efficiently allocate resources. I examine the opposite scenario to understand if the im-
plementation of a regulation could result in a move away from markets to hierarchies.
5I don’t address the literature on the role of anti-trust and price regulations on vertical integration
within an industry. Since anti-trust reforms are often a reaction to the organizational equilibrium of an
industry, the results from these papers are addressing a different question from the one I’m considering.
5My work speaks to a growing empirical literature on vertical integration that uses a micro-
level, industry specific strategy to understand the determinants of organizational choices.6
A number of papers in the past decade have examined how organizational choices are af-
fected by contractual incompleteness and transactional complexities.7 For example, Hub-
bard (2001) provides evidence that market thickness in the trucking industry coincides with
differences in contract types. In markets where the supply of trucks was greater and quasi-
rents lower, spot-price contracting was utilized to a higher degree. In two related papers,
Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) examine how the introduction of monitoring technology
changed ownership choices. Novak and Stern (2008a) consider the setting of luxury auto
makers where the firm makes many buy-or-contract choices and find there exists comple-
mentarity across these choices. Finally, Forbes and Lederman (2009) argue that integrated
airline companies are better able to address high ex-post bargaining costs. They illustrate
this by showing integration is more likely along airline paths where weather is more variable
and along well traveled routes where adaptation is more costly.
The work in this area has also linked firm governance choices to efficiency outcome which
implies that my results may result in efficiency gains worth the policy makers considera-
tion. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) find that productivity differences across integration
structures can largely be explained by the characteristics of the firms. Ready-mix cement
producers of comparable size and technology, irrespective of their organizational form, are
similarly productive. But many of the other studies find a relationship between organi-
zational choices and efficiency. Novak and Stern (2008b) use 15 years of data on changes
to car models to understand how the degree of integration affects consumer quality mea-
sures. They find that initial performance is improved by outsourcing tasks but that the
long-run quality of a model is associated with firms better able to adapt to unexpected
6Lafontaine and Slade (2007) provide a thorough survey on the empirical studies of vertical integration.
7Although not industry specific in nature, Acemoglu et al. (2009) show that the level of integration is
higher for countries where financial development is high but so are contracting costs. Alfaro et al. (2013)
find that integration responds to changes in tariff laws (pecuniary motives) which is a prediction consistent
with a model imbedding Hart and Holmstrom (2010) into a market setting (Legros and Newman, 2013).
6changes. The authors highlight that different theories of the firm can explain the variation
in performance outcomes across the life-cycle of a product, particularly when considered
in the context of factors such as external technology opportunities and firm capabilities.
Most recently, Forbes and Lederman (2010) find fewer delays and cancelation for airlines
that own their regional partners as compared to those that contract with an independent
regional. This result is stronger for routes more susceptible to variable weather conditions
where the need for adaptation is greater.
Finally, the results of my paper are relevant to the literature in environmental economics
and policy literature on the effects of regulatory policy on compliance. A number of
papers have examined the effectiveness of increased penalties and regulatory actions on
environmental and health and safety outcomes (see Gray and Shimshack (2011) for a full
review). OSHA inspections on manufacturing plants resulted in an increase in compliance
and a decrease in injury incidence at inspected plants (Gray and Jones, 1991; Gray and
Scholz, 1993; Weil, 1996) but the effects were differential given plant characteristics and
declined over time (Gray and Mendeloff, 2005). In other settings, EPA enforcement can lead
to "over-compliance" (Shimshack and Ward, 2008). Weil (2014) discusses how the change
in organizational structures of firms, particularly the fissuring of employment, can lead
to regulatory avoidance. Given the changes to the market structure towards larger firms
and safer operations, this paper suggests another mechanism through which regulatory
oversight can influence compliance and outcomes.
1.3 Coal Mining in the US
Coal has been central to American economic development since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury (Wright, 1990). The US has the largest recoverable reserves of coal in the world,
the overwhelming majority of which (81 percent) is used in domestic energy production.
Although growing concerns over pollution and technological advances that have yielded
7cheaper, cleaner substitutes have reduced relative demand in recent decades, coal still ac-
counts for the largest share (37 percent) of any power source for electricity production in
the US, and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future (US Energy Informa-
tion Administration, 2013).8 In this section, I provide background information on coal
production and the coal industry that is relevant to my empirical analysis.
Coal extraction falls under two broad categories: surface and underground mining. Tech-
nology and productivity associated with each method are quite different. Surface operations
require larger fixed costs in terms of permitting and machinery but are less labor inten-
sive than underground operations. The method of mining chosen by a company is largely
determined by the geological characteristics of an area. The measure that most industry
experts consider when choosing the method of extraction is overburden which describes
the material, including rock, soil, plants and trees, that lie above a coal seam.9 Another
important factor that influences the type of technology used at a mine is the seam height.
Larger seams allow for more productive, automated methods. These two measures are com-
bined to create a stripping ratio which is most easily described as the amount of non-coal
material that needs to be removed to mine one ton of ore. When stripping ratios are too
high it becomes uneconomical to mine the coal using a surface method. If this is the case,
underground methods will be utilized instead. Figure 1.1 provides a visual representation
of this idea and the different mining methods that are typical in the industry.
Differences in regional overburden and seam height are manifested in the variety of mining
operations seen throughout the US. Western coal mines benefit from low overburden and
8The New York Times featured a piece on threats currently facing the coal industry: "For generations,
coal has been king in this Appalachian town. It provided heat, light and jobs for the hundreds of people
who worked in the nearby coal mines and the smoke-coughing Big Sandy power plant that burned their
black bounty. But now, coal is in a corner. Across the United States, the industry is under siege, threatened
by new regulations from Washington, environmentalists fortified by money from Michael R. Bloomberg, the
billionaire mayor of New York City, and natural gas companies intent on capturing much of the nation’s
energy market (Lipton, 2012)."
9Although overburden can be correlated with elevation and coverage it is not always a one-to-one rela-
tionship. Mountainous areas tend to have higher overburden than flat regions, but it also depends on where
the coal seam is located. Coal seams near the apex of a mountain have a relatively low overburden value.
This is why mountaintop mining methods are popular in regions like Eastern Kentucky.
8thick seams; these geological features allow for coal removal using extremely efficient surface
methods like dragline extraction. Similar methods cannot be utilized by surface operations
in areas east of the Mississippi. Wider variation in eastern geology helps to explain why
both underground and surface techniques are used to pull coal from the same seams and
within close geographic proximity to one another. The geographical overlap of extraction
methods used in the east is evident from Figure 1.2. Due to productivity and transportation
differences in eastern and western coal, the majority of coal used in electricity generation
originates from the western US, though eastern coal production is not insignificant. In
2005, a little more than 40% of US coal production came from the Illinois and Appalachian
basins (EIA, 2005).10
The reason for height and accessibility differences between regions can be linked back to
the varied geographic development of the US economy. The eastern US is the birthplace
of coal production and the most easily accessible seams are largely exhausted. The mining
methods currently used to extract coal from presently viable seams result in considerable
debris. This undesired matter is difficult to filter out from the coal and the raw ore requires
a complicated process of sorting, sizing, re-sorting and "cleaning".11 The operation that
provides this service is referred to as a preparation facility. Preparation is required of
almost all coal east of the Mississippi whether originating from surface or underground
operations (NAS, 2007).
Processing facilities are large, capital intensive operations. They usually have direct access
to waterways or rail to minimize transportation costs. Rather than building new facilities,
companies tend to refurbish or rebuild on the same site resulting in the location of prepa-
ration plants in the US remaining relatively constant since their inception (NAS, 2007).
Mines on the other hand are variable in terms of both size, location and operation length.12
10Illinois, Indiana and Kentucky make up most of the Illinois coal basin and the Appalachian basin covers
Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia, Virginia, and Alabama.
11A substantial portion of the raw ore that enters a facility is removed before heading to its final market
destination. Average yield rates range from high 50 percent to low 60 percent.
12The average length of production in the dataset is 3.5 years for an underground mine and a little more
9Preparation costs can make up anywhere from 15 to 25 percent of the total cost of mining
but are a necessary step in the supply chain.
A final factor in the choice of mining methods is the price of coal. There are considerable
coal reserves in the US but the more relevant measure is the amount of reserves that are
economically viable. This is referred to as recoverable reserves and depends on the price
of coal. If prices increase, reserves that were once infeasible become economically viable
to mine. Figure 1.3 shows average quarterly utility costs for coal by state of origin for the
period of relevance to this paper.13 The figure indicates that, at least for the coal produced
in the eastern US, prices have stayed relatively flat and thus the choice of viable seams and
mining methods for those seams are constant over the period.
1.3.1 The MINER Act of 2006
Although mine safety has improved since the inception of coal mining as evidenced by
Figure 1.4, recent history has seen a few high profile accidents resulting in the death of a
number of miners. In response to the Sago mining disaster, which resulted in the death of
12 miners, the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (the MINER
Act of 2006) was passed into law on June 15, 2006.14 The law provides the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) with greater leeway to punish unsafe operations. Officially
formed in the late 70’s with the passage of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
MSHA is the main regulatory body for the mining industry.15 It is charged with reducing
fatalities, injuries and promoting health and safety of mine workers.16 The 2006 MINER
than 3 years for a surface mine. In 2005, the mean size in terms of production for underground operations
was 131,693 short tons per quarter and for surface operations it is 71,947 short tons per quarter.
13Transaction data for utilities in the US is gathered by the EIA using the FERC 423 form.
14The Sago Mine disaster refers to an explosion that occurred on January 2, 2006 in the Upshur county
of West Virginia. In total, 13 miners were trapped during the accident and only 1 survived the incident.
Mining accidents at the Aracoma and Darby operations resulted in 7 more deaths roughly around the same
time period. The 19 person death toll created considerable political pressure for reform.
15The precursor to MSHA was the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) which was
part of the Department of the Interior which was created under the 1969 Coal Act.
16http://www.msha.gov/faq/faqhome.htm
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Act’s implementation occurred in the following stages:
• MSHA was immediately allowed to request an injunction (shutting down a mine) in
cases where the mine had refused to pay a final order MSHA penalty.17
• An added category of "flagrant" violations could be assessed at a value of $220,000.
• Each underground mine was required to add training and safety escape plans within
60 days of the MINER Act passage.
• The Final Rule on Civil Penalties was published on March 22, 2007 and became
effective on April 23, 2007. This raised the minimum civil penalty by close to 100%
and the maximum by 16%.18
• The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) finished their
recommendation for refuge alternatives in December 2007. The Final Act was im-
plemented in December 2008. The requirement of refuges and air units only affected
underground operations. Thus, underground operations faced additional safety costs
of approximately $200,000.19
• On January 16, 2009, MSHA published Program Policy Letter No. P09-V-1 which
stated by June 15, 2009, lifelines and underground miner tracking had to be imple-
mented. This was put in place to ensure that the precise location of miners working
underground was known in the case of an accident and subsequent rescue operation.
Prior to the Sago mining disaster, the Bush administration’s relationship with the coal
industry was considered quite friendly and there was little expectation of an increase in
17http://www.msha.gov/mineract/MineActAmmendmentSummary.asp
18A full comparison of violation point assignment changes and the corresponding penalty amounts before
and after the law is provided in the 30 CFR Part 100 issued by MSHA: http://www.msha.gov/REGS/
FEDREG/FINAL/2007finl/07-1402.pdf.
19Refuges cost roughly $80,000 to build and have a net present value ranging from from 300,000 to 500,000
- much of this cost is the result of necessary moving costs (MSHA, 2007; NIOSH, 2007).
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regulatory oversight.20 Within days of the accident major news outlets were running stories
and op-eds calling for reforms.21 The most substantial aspect of the reform, the increase
in penalty assessments, became effective on April 23, 2007.22 The impact of the penalties
was swift and large as evidenced by news coverage and the data.23
Figure 1.5 shows the increase in average penalty values was considerably higher among
underground operations relative to surface and prep plants at the time of the publication
of the new point system. The average quarterly penalty assessment catapulted with the
posting of the new penalty assessment system, increasing from under $5,000 to $40,000.
Figure 1.6 illustrates that not only was the average penalty value increasing, so were
the number of citations. The other costs, though not immediate, were large; the reform
20"Comparisons with previous administrations are complex, because mining methods have changed and
the number of underground mines has steadily decreased. But agency critics, including several former
MSHA officials, say that relatively light sanctions, coupled with the Bush administration’s more collegial
approach to regulation, make it harder for inspectors to force noncompliant companies to change. ’There
was a dramatic shift in MSHA’s philosophy in 2001, with a new emphasis on cooperation by the enforcers,’
said J. Davitt McAteer, who headed the agency under the Clinton administration, ’and it came at a cost
of less enforcement of the statute.’" Joby Warrick, Washington Post, "Sago Mine Safety Declined Sharply",
January 9, 2006.
21"Just as Hurricane Katrina forced Americans to look at the face of lingering poverty and racism, this
mining tragedy should focus us all on another forgotten, mistreated corner of society. ... The dozen
dead miners deserve to be memorialized with fresh scrutiny of the state of mine safety regulation and a
resurrection of political leadership willing to look beyond Big Coal to the interests of those who risk their
lives in the mines." New York Time Op-Ed, "The Sago Mine Disaster", January 5, 2006.
22MSHA issued PIL 106-111-02 implementing new minimum civil penalties on August 29, 2006 and a
proposed rule was published on September 8, 2006. Public hearings were held during September and
October 2006 (6 hearings were held in total, they were specifically on the following dates in the fall of 2006:
September 26th and 28th, October 4th, 6th, 17th and 19th. They were held at various locations across
the country.) MSHA issued PIL 106-111-04 establishing procedures for evaluating "flagrant" violations on
October 26, 2006. It also reopened and extended the comment period to November 9, 2006 (71 FR 62572).
Final rule published on March 22, 2007.
23"The world has changed for mine operators and the mine safety community. The legislative and regu-
latory response to recent disasters has been swift and far reaching. Now, in addition to constantly striving
to improve safety, operators must also be mindful of the numerous ways in which MSHA’s enforcement
authority has been enhanced in determining whether, and how, to respond to penalty assessments and to
the factual allegations contained in citations and orders. ... Congress has given MSHA bigger and sharper
teeth to make the "or else" considerably more meaningful." (Perlmutter, 2008); "In addition to the new
categories of penalties, MSHA also changed its penalty formula in a way that virtually guarantees increases
in assessments for even garden-variety regulatory violations. ... Although the maximum penalty of $70,000
is not all that much higher than the previous limit, because of the expanded ranges points now add up
much more quickly, as do the corresponding penalties."(Perlmutter, 2008); "The new regulations could have
significant financial impacts on an operation. Let’s start with the worst case scenario. Under the MINER
Act, the maximum civil penalty for flagrant violations is $220,000. MSHA has already shown its willingness
to flex this particular muscle, issuing $795,600 in flagrant penalties fines to R&D Coal Co. in April 2007."
(Fulton, 2007).
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increased current and expected costs for underground mines. This meant that relative to
surface mines, production of coal from underground operations became more costly. The
upper bound increase in penalties was small (16 percent) compared to the lower bound
(100 percent) and as a result had a disproportionate impact on smaller operations.24
The reform didn’t just increase the cost of doing business for mine operators. The in-
junction clause in the MINER Act gave MSHA regulatory teeth to ensure compliance by
allowing the agency to shut down a mine indefinitely for bad behavior. Although the first
actual injunction wasn’t issued until 2010, 68 potential pattern of violation (PPOV) let-
ters, a precursor to a shut down, were issued between 2007 and 2009. In addition, the
added oversight and increase in citations resulted in a greater inspector presence at mine
sites and interruptions to production in order to correct violations. Thus, production from
upstream sources became more variable for the preparation plant. If this variability was
large enough, the preparation plant may decide to buy up a mine or open up their own in
order to assure a basic level of supply and quality.25
The penalty system also required operators to be more savvy about repeat violations
(Hendrix, 2011). Low risk repeated violations can raise penalty values associated with
future citations if enough of them are received. Additionally, owning multiple operations
made each citation more expensive under the new penalty structure. Consider two mines
that receive the same citation but one is run by an operator that operates other mines and
the other is an independent operation. The history of violations and repeat violations are
calculated at an operator basis, not the mine-level. As a result, a given citation will be
costlier for the mine owned by an operator with other mines if the other owned-operations
have also received violations. Thus, the penalty structure has increased the regulatory
liability of ownership. This added cost is likely to reduce the incentives of a preparation
24The larger companies in the industry make net profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The
average operation makes a few million, if they are profitable.
25Although the exact mechanism for why this is true has been hard to discern, multiple interviews have
indicated owning both a preparation plant and a mine allows for greater control of the production process.
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plant to own a supplying mine.
A priori, it’s not clear which of these effects will matter more. Higher costs of ownership
are likely to decrease integration whereas the need for control should increase it. To better
understand in what way the reform influenced market structure, I turn to the data.
1.4 Data and Trends
1.4.1 Data
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), along with its regulatory mandate,
collects detailed data on all coal mining operations in the US. To illustrate the magnitude
of the reform, I draw upon MSHA’s database of citations. These data contain each citation
issued to a mine; the severity and reason for the citation; the proposed penalty, and if or
when it was paid by the operator. Data on injuries are also collected by the agency, with
detailed explanations of the number of individuals hurt and the type of injuries sustained.
MSHA gathers quarterly production and employment data for each active operation by its
subunit.26 27 Production numbers associated with the underground and surface subunits
are used to determine the average size of mines within a market.28
These data include complete administrative records on changes to controllers and operators
from the late 1970’s to the present.29 Controllers are the individuals or corporate entities
that own an operator ; the operator is the company or subsidiary running the day-to-day
26A mine can contain multiple subunits. These include underground, surface at an underground, surface,
preparation plant, and office workers
27MSHA only gathers employment data for facilities. There is no publicly available data source that
provides production numbers for preparation plants.
28MSHA determines size using short tons of raw coal production as labor choices vary widely across
operation type. Stoker et al. (2005) provide a detailed explanation of mining methods and labor productivity
in coal mining.
29The publicly available MSHA data can be obtained at: http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/
OGIMSHA.asp. The full set of administrative records required to determine operation and ownership
histories were received from MSHA upon written request by the author.
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mine activities and production. The controller and operator histories are linked to the mine
data such that a complete ownership history is available for each mine and preparation
facility in the US. These data are used to determine if a mine and preparation plant are
owned by the same firm.
Market demand for coal depends on its price and quality. The Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA) surveys electricity producers on both outcomes. The forms EIA-423
and FERC-423 are used to collect monthly transaction data for electricity producers in
the US (utility and non-utility, respectively) for the period 2002 to 2007. The data are
at the transaction level, and indicate the county from where the coal originates. Starting
in 2008, the two forms are combined into one and each transaction lists the MSHA ID of
the operation producing the input coal.30 All versions of the form provide coal quality
information and the cost paid per million BTU (mmBTU ).31
The geology of an area is a key determinant of the method of mining. To measure local
markets, proximity of preparation plants to mines and geological characteristics, a number
of geographic tools and data were compiled. GPS locations and addresses are available
for all mines and facilities in the MSHA database but were verified and expanded for the
purpose of this analysis.32 County level maps of the US and a number of important data
layers, referred to as shapefiles, were collected. Specifically, coal field shapefiles were ob-
tained from from the United States Geological Survey (USGS).33 Waterway and railroad
shapefiles for 1880 were provided by Atack et al. (2010); these are important for my iden-
tification strategy. Finally, shapefiles from the National Coal Assessment on overburden,
elevation and bed thickness were used for further robustness checks. The coordinates of
30Both EIA-423 and FERC-423 data are available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia423/. Form
923 data are available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/index.html
31A BTU is the amount of energy needed to heat one pound of water by one degree Farenheit. It is a
function of the delivered cost and the heat content of the coal.
32The author used Tele Atlas to fill in missing or incorrect address information. Tele Atlas has a com-
mercial service arm that performs this service. Tele Atlas is one of the world’s top mapping and navigation
data companies and is a subsidiary of TomTom.
33All data is available through the USGS website: http://energy.usgs.gov/Coal/AssessmentsandData/
CoalAssessments.aspx#378437-overview
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coal mining operations in the US was overlayed on these maps and shapefiles and distance
measures were calculated using ArcGIS 10.1 and StataSE 12.
1.4.2 Treatment and Control Groups
I use a differences-in-differences approach to measure how the reform changed the likeli-
hood a preparation plant would own a local mine. The law increased the penalties for all
operation types. However, in terms of actual realized costs, the law’s largest effect was
on underground operations. The law also coincided with an increase in the scrutiny un-
derground operations faced in a given inspection, as evidenced by Figure 1.6.34 It would
seem straightforward to implement a treatment and control group based on mines that are
underground and those that are surface, but the mine doesn’t define the market, it’s the
facility. The market as defined by the location of the facility is a static entity which is an
important feature for any pre versus post analysis.
The decision for a preparation plant to own its suppliers or not will be affected by whether
its suppliers are underground or surface operations. As discussed in the previous section,
raw ore contains debris and is quite costly to transport prior to preparation. Coal is usually
hauled from mines to preparation facilities by conveyor belts or trucks. Wheelage rates,
rules on load size and local public opinion make it costly to travel long distances (NAS,
2007). This limits the area from which a preparation plant sources coal to not much larger
than a 10 mile radius but typically the preference is over a shorter distance. If one draws
a 10km radius around each preparation facility in 2005, the majority of mines in the final
sample are included in the analysis.35
34The law did not make provisions for more inspections or stricter standards, but due to the general
change in public attitude and political pressure, previous rules for inspections were followed more closely.
35This radius has been determined based on conversations with Brian Sullivan of Alpha Natural Resources
and operators from Arch and Armstrong mines in Kentucky. The 10km radius capture 68 percent of the
surface mines and 89 percent of the underground operations in the final sample area in 2005. A 5km radius
drops these percentages significantly to 36 and 58 percent respectively, a 15km radius increases them to 82
percent and 97 percent.
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The spatial constraints on hauls provide a restriction on the potential supply of coal for
preparation facilities. The preparation plant can either choose to own the local mines that
feed it raw ore or contract with these operations. This is a classic example of the choice of a
firm to backwards integrate. Of the preparation facilities east of the Mississippi in 2005, 55
percent owned a mine in the surrounding 10km radius (limiting and expanding the radius
to 5km or 15km changes this percentage to 49 percent and 62 percent, respectively).36
Now that the potential market from which the preparation plant can receive coal is defined,
the next step is to determine which of these markets was most affected by the reform.
Surface mining is typically the preferred method of extraction and areas where surface
mining isn’t suitable, underground methods are pursued. Areas with lower elevation and
gradients are associated with less overburden which is a strong predictor of the likelihood
of surface mining (all else being equal, lower overburden implies a lower stripping ratio
which means surface methods can be utilized). Using current measures of elevation to
determine the trade-offs for a particular mining method is problematic because it is partially
determined by production and organizational choices over the past 50 years. Mountaintop
mining methods drastically changed and continue to alter the landscape and environment
of the Appalachian region (Loeb, 1997). Consider Figure 1.7 which shows the landscape
of the Laurel Creek mining complex prior to and following mountaintop mining. The
gradient and the elevation of the area is now lower, but the method currently in use
there is underground mining because the accessible surface coal is largely exhausted. The
delineation of treatment and control markets needs to be determined by geography not
influenced by modern mining methods.37
Although maps and elevation data are not widely available from the 19th century, trans-
portation networks from the mid to late 1800’s have been compiled by Atack et al. (2010).
36The results of this paper are robust to the market size. The smaller radius yields similar coefficients
which are marginally insignificant. The 15km radius has slightly larger results and is more significant.
37Mountaintop mining is a method first used in 1967 on the Cannelton Mine located in West Virginia
(Chamblin, 2002). Getting elevation data prior to this period is difficult but is something I’m pursuing as
a way to further validate the results.
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Railroads and waterways were a key factor in the location of coal production during the
industrial revolution but also provide a proxy for geological features of that time period.
Water beds are typically in low lying areas and due to technology constraints of the time
period, railroads couldn’t easily transverse steep and mountainous regions (Rodrigue et al.,
2009). Areas near historic transport networks (defined as being within 10 miles) are thus
likely to have lower overburden today and be on average better suited for surface mining.
Preparation plants in these locations are assigned to the control group whereas facilities
located outside of this band are considered "treated".38 The USGS does track overburden
and seam thickness across some of the largest coalbeds in the US. The treatment sample
based on historical transport systems is positively correlated with current overburden mea-
sures. Additionally, the mine counts in Table 1.1 show that underground methods are a
higher proportion of total mines in treated markets as compared to control markets.
The sample of preparation plants is further restricted to ensure the two groups face a similar
demand environment. The regional differences highlighted previously would indicate that
the markets for eastern versus western coal are quite different. Since there are relatively
few underground operations in the western part of the US, the focus of this paper is on
preparation plants and mines east of the Mississippi. This sample is further limited to
preparation plants located on the Appalachian coal bed. This is done for a few reasons.
Variation across individual coal seams exists, but there is greater similarity in seam quality
and thickness within beds than across them. The Illinois basin has lower quality coal and
is predominantly surface operations. The demand market it is facing is different enough
that it makes a less than ideal sample for the analysis.
38Since coal quality was of less importance during this time period, using this delineation of control and
treatment should also avoid bias in terms of coal quality.
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1.4.3 Measures and Empirical Approach
The data are structured such that the unit of analysis is the preparation plant, the relevant
actor making the choice to integrate or not. Each preparation plant is linked to mines
within a 10 kilometer radius. For each quarter a preparation plant is considered vertically
integrated if it owns one or more mines within this radius.
This measure can be thought of as the extensive margin outcome of interest and captures
whether preparation plants change their general ownership model for a given market. Ta-
ble 1.1 provides statistics on this outcome across markets that were and weren’t in close
proximity to historic transport networks as well as other characteristics of the two groups.
Vertical integration in areas not near 1880 railroads and rivers increased by 9 percentage
points from 2005 to 2007 whereas the control group saw a slight decrease in the mean
integration over the same period.
Some of the major differences across the two regions are evident in the composition of the
type of mine. This is reassuring in terms of the strategy of treatment and control assign-
ment. One would expect, given the correlation to current overburden and seam thickness
measures, that the treatment group should have a higher percentage of underground mines
relative to the control. The summary statistics show that this holds in the data.
More importantly, the trend seen in the control group should be the trend experienced
by the treatment market but-for the change in law. Figure 1.9 illustrates the impact of
the reform on the outcome measure of interest across the two types of markets. The first
vertical line indicates the Sago mining disaster, the second the passage of the MINER Act
and the last is the beginning of the new penalty regime. Prior to the reform, the groups
are trending similarly and the change in the treatment group only appears with the initial
shock of the mining disaster. To show this more formally, I regress the dependent variable
of interest on the regression covariates. The residuals from these results are plotted in
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Figure 1.10. The treatment and control group track each other quite consistently prior
to the reform and there’s only a major shift at the beginning of 2006, when the mining
disasters occurred.
Integration can also be thought along an intensive measure, that is to what extent a firm
owns its inputs. Production data for mines exist but input/output production data for prep
facilities are not publicly available. What is available is employment size of prep plants
and capacity information on roughly half the sample.39 As a result, I assign a measure of
capacity for each preparation plant based on its average employee size and use it to create
a measure that represents the percent of local market production used to fulfill capacity.
This outcome of interest is constructed by using the production of owned mines and the
estimated capacity. Given the way capacity is assigned, there’s the potential for measure-
ment error. Alternative definitions of how vertically integrated a preparation facility is
with its local market are considered as well. Particularly, I calculate the percent of total
raw ore production in its local market that is owned by a preparation plant and the number
of owned mines as a percent of total mines a facility owns within a 10km radius.
To formally determine how the reform influenced vertical integration, the following equation
is estimated:
yist = αs + ηReformt + τDs ∗Reformt +mi + ist (1.1)
Where yist is either the extensive measure (a dummy variable) or the intensive measures
(percentages). The prep plant is the unit of observation, i, in treatment group s at time
t where s takes on a value of either treatment or control. The analysis examines the
39Coal Age has a preparation plant census it conducts every year. They list information on most of the
major preparation facilities in the US, but miss a number of preparation plants that are in the MSHA
database. Additionally, it is difficult to match them to the data as MSHA ID’s are not provided for the
facilities in the census.
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impact of the change in penalty amounts by looking before and after the reform, Reformt.
I exploit the panel nature of the dataset and include facility fixed effects. τ will be an
unbiased estimator of the impact of the reform if the cov(Ds ∗ Reformt, it) = 0, that is,
the change in treatment status is uncorrelated with the errors.
I include a number of time varying controls at the mine and county level to address dif-
ferences in external demand factors. For instance, I use the average price by county for
delivered coal paid for by coal burning utility plants as recent evidence suggests this too
can impact the integration choice (Alfaro et al., 2013). I also control for county-level qual-
ity of coal as measured by ash, sulfur and btu content. Finally, whether a market has the
potential for metallurgical coal is used as the market for this coal, although small, is mostly
export focused.
1.5 Results
Table 1.2 shows the law had a real effect on the number of underground mines across all
markets but particularly those in the treated markets. Treated markets tended to have
larger sized markets in terms of number of mines prior to the reform which is a likely
explanation for the differential exit across the treatment and control groups. I examine
injuries in 2005 for mines that exit relative to those that remain in the sample across
the treatment arms. The results indicate that mines that were in the treated group and
dropped out of the sample were more dangerous than those that remained in the sample
using the traumatic injury measure (see Table 1.3). These results speak to the fact that
the law had a real and significant impact on the local markets for preparation facilities.
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1.5.1 Extensive Margin
The first set of results examining the effect of the reform on integration are done using
a basic OLS specification (see Panel A of Table 1.4). The results indicate the reform
had a strong, positive impact on vertical integration. This naïve approach doesn’t control
for all specific facility level characteristics. It is possible that these results are driven by
unobserved attributes of the markets around a preparation plant that aren’t controlled for
by the covariates included in the regression. If these attributes are correlated with the
treatment or control group assignment, or the reform measure, then the results will be
biased.
To deal with this issue, the same regressions are run using preparation plant fixed effects.
This preferred specification is provided in Panel B of Table 1.4. In comparison to the OLS
results, the coefficients using fixed effects in the estimation are smaller, but the overall effect
remains positive on the extensive outcome measure. The coefficient on the interaction term
in the first column is .073 which can be interpreted as the effect of the reform was an increase
in the likelihood of integration by 7.3 percentage points. Based on the first column of Table
1.4, over half the change seen in the treatment group’s organizational shift between 2005
and 2007 can be attributed to the reform (this is based on the increase from 61 percent
to 70 percent for the treatment group seen in Table 1.1). This implies a percent change
in vertical integration of 12 percent. A version including quarterly dummies, does little to
change these results. I then include versions aggregated to the pre and post period in order
to address the issue of serial correlation that can exist in this type of analysis (Bertrand
et al., 2004). Particularly, I look at the minimum or maximum of the outcome variable in
2005 and then again for second to the fourth quarter in 2007. The results are quite similar
to the quarterly version, although just barely insignificant for the maximum specification.
The cut-off between treated and control could appear arbitrary. Instead of delineating
a treatment and control group by a specific distance from a transport network, I let the
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treatment be a continuous variable that captures the distance of a preparation plant from a
waterway. These results are presented in Table 1.5 and indicate that integration increases
with every additional kilometer movement away from a waterway.
In the brief discussion on the empirical specification, I assumed that E[ist] = 0. In practice,
this assumption may not hold as the unit of observation is the market surrounding the prep
plant and there exists overlap of these markets (as evidenced by Figure 1.8). To deal with
this issue, I repeat the analysis using standard errors clustered at the county level. Although
this is not a perfect measure, it captures the overlap of markets better than clustering at
the preparation plant. The results are almost identical to the specifications in Table 1.4.
The choice to restrict the sample to the Appalachian region is justifiable not only for
ensuring the underground and surface mines are competing for similar markets, but also in
terms of comparability of coal quality (NAS, 2007). To illustrate that the selection of this
group isn’t driving the results, I include the full sample of all preparation plants and mines
east of the Mississippi. Panel A of Table 1.7 shows that not only is significance greater
across all the columns, the coefficients are slightly higher.
A number of additional robustness checks are presented in Table 1.8. The first panel shows
a variation of the treatment definition. Particularly, there may be some concern that
where railroads were built had less to do with geographic features and more to do with
potentially endogenous factors. If I use only riverways in 1880, a purely geographic feature,
to determine the treated markets, the impact of the reform is actually larger across the
specification. The other assumption I make is that markets are defined by a 10km radius.
To dispel the notion that I’ve selected a specific radius size to find the integration effect,
I show the results using alternative radii to define potential supplier markets. Panel B in
Table 1.8 shows a market defined by a 5km radius. This market size is quite small, and as
discussed previously, co-located operation are already vertically integrated, so it would be
surprising to find much of an effect. That being said, the results are of a similar magnitude
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although they are marginally insignificant. Panel C in Table 1.8 provides the results for a
larger market radius of 15km. Here the effects are quite similar to the 10km market both
in terms of magnitude and significance.40
1.5.2 Intensive Margin
I repeat the analysis looking at the intensity of integration. The measures I consider are
the percent of production and number of mines owned by a preparation plant in its local
market. The results, provided in Table 1.9, indicate there was no effect on integration
across these measures following the reform. Table 1.10 uses the capacity measure which
doesn’t mechanically increase in response to the change in mine composition induced by
the reform. These results suggest a negative effect on the intensity of integration, although
statistically insignificant. Given the extensive margin results, this suggests that something
else is going on if the intensity of integration appears to have changed little over the same
period. Since the increase in integration is occurring for mines that weren’t previously
integrated, I examine markets that were already integrated prior to the reform.
Table 1.6 and Table 1.11 provide the intensive margin results for these previously integrated
markets. These results show a statistically significant decrease in the intensity of integration
among already integrated markets. This result taken with the extensive margin results
indicate that the reform had two major competing effects which changed the organizational
structure of the industry. The riskiness of production induced by the reform resulted in an
increase in integration to assure a consistent level of supply but the increased liability in
the penalty structure resulted in a decrease in integration in already integrated markets.
40The method of defining all markets by the same distance doesn’t allow for differences in transport
costs across preparation plants. I’m currently gathering transport networks and cost data on tonnage by
transport method. I plan on using this to construct a preparation plant specific market radius depending
on available transportation network resources and the maximum amount the plant would be willing to pay
to transport raw tonnage given market prices. Although this will be a valuable exercise, it will likely not
change the results greatly as the 15km radius is very close to the upper bound distance an operation will
be willing to haul raw ore.
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These countervailing forces explain why the intensity of integration appeared unchanged
over the period despite the strong extensive margin effect.
1.5.3 Threats to Validity
The following discussion addresses a number of the concerns that arise with a differences-
in-differences analysis. These include issues of omitted variables, selection and spurious
correlation. I address each of these issues separately to convince the reader the vertical
integration finding is a result of the regulatory reform.
1.5.3.1 Omitted Variables
The unexpected and tragic nature of the Sago accident makes the starting period of this
study well defined. Considering the trajectory of Figure 1.9 and the timing of the imple-
mentation of the MINER Act, the second quarter of 2007 is an intuitive cut off to examine
vertical integration outcomes. Although a little more than a year isn’t a lengthy time lapse,
it does allow for the possibility of other factors to influence the integration choice. This
section presents these potential alternative explanations and makes the case that they are
unlikely drivers of the vertical integration results I find.
To the extent that the treatment and control groups proxy for relative overburden measures,
then changes related to the site clean up of surface mines could differentially influence the
control group during the same time as the MINER ACT was affecting the treatment group.
The government entity in charge of surface reclamations is the Office of Surface Mining
(OSM).41 During the 2005 to 2007 period, there were no major reclamation law changes
41Reclamation refers to the clean-up and environmental protection of land that is used for surface mining.
Mountaintop removal causes considerable upheaval to the natural geography of a region. The passage of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ensured there was accountability in the post-mining
cleanup through instituting permits and up front bond payments.
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nor were there any restrictions in permitting.42 In December of 2008, the 2008 Stream
Buffer Zone Rule was enacted. The rule strengthened pre-existing regulations intended to
protect water from pollution associated with coal. The timing of this law is outside of any
of the samples included in the regressions. Also, it was the result of a change in policy
associated with a new administration. It is unlikely that expectations for new regulations
on surface operations would have had a role in my analysis.
A second possible issue would result if the historical areas determining the treatment and
control groups were associated with differences in coal quality. If pollution laws coincided
with the MINER Act, then quality differences across control and treatment groups could
drive the integration result. The samples are relatively homogenous across quality mea-
sures; the summary statistics don’t show a large difference between the groups. Coal prices
and quality are further controlled for in all the regressions. During the 1990’s and 2000’s
different stages of the Clean Air Act were implemented (Ellerman et al., 2000). One roll
out of the reform was scheduled for the 2005 to 2007 period. The change over of these
severe polluting coal fired power plants to using cleaner methods was delayed due to actions
taken by the Bush administration. Only recently have these plants gone offline or added
scrubbers, which not surprisingly has resulted in huge shifts in coal quality demand. But
there was no change in demand during the law passage and roll-out of the penalties.
1.5.3.2 Selection
Another potential concern with this estimation strategy is that the law induced a compo-
sitional change in the treated and control markets. Since the treatment and control groups
are determined by physical location, the definition remains static pre and post reform. All
plants are included in the sample, even those that enter after the reform. This is because
the plans for such plants are determined years in advance (Fiscor, 2005). Restricting the
42In fact, there are many more permits issued than are ever used.
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analysis to prep plants that were in operation in 2005 and forward yields almost identical
results (see Panel B of Table 1.7).
Another issue that could bias the results is the entrance of newer preparation plants.
Although I’ve argued that facilities are static, the past decade has witnessed an increase
in the stock of preparation plants in the US (Fiscor, 2005; NAS, 2007). To ensure that
selection into the treatment and control markets based on current market conditions aren’t
driving the results, I limit the sample to preparation plants that were built earlier than
1995. This would imply that many of them were planned prior the 1990 Clean Air Act
and the subsequent changes to Btu requirements for coal burning electricity plants that
increased the demand for coal preparation. The choice to build in a particular location can
be more easily thought of as a given condition with this specification. The coefficients are
larger and more significant for this selected group of preparation plants with the results
ranging from an 8 to an 11 percent increase in integration for treated markets following
the reform (see Panel C of Table 1.7).
1.5.3.3 Falsification Test
Finally, I provide the results of a falsification test to illustrate that the results are not
a product of the treatment groups or the timing of the reform. I create a false reform
dummy for the first quarter of 2004 and subsequent quarters to emulate the timing of the
Sago mining disaster. I then repeat the main set of specifications, including preparation
plant fixed effects, but consider 2003 and 2005 as the pre and post periods of interest.
These results are reported in Table 1.12 and indicate this treatment group interacted with
the fake reform has no impact on vertical integration. In fact, none of the coefficients of
interest are significant in this specification. I repeat this looking at the time period 2000
to 2002 and find no effect over this period either. The change in vertical integration seen
from 2005 to 2007 doesn’t appear to be a spurious result driven by the selected treatment
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and control groups or seasonal fluctuations that coincided with the reform.
1.6 Discussion
Consider the Kepler No. 1 preparation facility in Wyoming County, WV (MSHA ID
4604637). It has been run by Kepler Processing Company LLC since 1995 and has been
under the control of Alpha Natural Resources since the second quarter of 2003. It is part
of Alpha’s Brooks Run South complex which has three preparation plants that clean and
process coal in their respective markets (Alpha, 2008).43 Since 2003, there were on average 4
mines in the nearby vicinity of this operation. In the third quarter of 2007, an underground
operation (MSHA ID 4609213) run by Brooks Run Mining Co LLC was opened by Alpha
and an underground mine (MSHA ID 4608593) run by Baylor Mining Co closed shortly
thereafter. Mines open and close fairly frequently and given the description from Alpha’s
10-K, they are most likely the owners of all the reserves and the official holders of all the
requisite permitting for the mines in these markets. Examining the SMCRA permit for
that underground mine, the permit holder is in fact Riverside Energy Company LLC a
subsidiary of Alpha. But the choice for Alpha to open an owner-operated mine rather than
just allow another independent operator to run it during this period is likely a reaction
to the new regulatory landscape. Although anecdotal, this provides some intuition for the
kind of ownership changes seen in the data.
The results indicate that there is a real organizational effect following the reform. As
discussed above, the reform changed risks and costs associated with production for un-
derground mines.44 The organizational literature provides a few different explanations for
43The other facilities are Litwar (MSHA ID 4605872) in McDowell County, WV and Moss # 3 (MSHA
ID 4402277) in Russell County, VA. Both own at least one mine in a 10km radius for the entire period.
44MSHA has one of the most comprehensive systems of any government agency in terms of tracking
citations, penalties, payments and threats of closure. Often times companies will refer to the MSHA
database on citations and orders rather than looking at their own records. The quality and quantity of the
product is also easily verifiable. Thus the channel of information is an unlikely pathway through which the
reform is affecting organizational change.
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why this could impact organizational choices of the preparation facility and the results
are certainly consistent with a number of models (Gibbons, 2005). But the results and
the structure of the reform suggest a story consistent with supply assurance and limiting
liability.
First, the integration results are positive and significant along the extensive margin. In
areas most affected by the reform where there is less ability for preparation plants to
substitute away from underground mining, facilities are more likely to own at least one
supplying mine. This story is similar in spirit to the supply assurance model of Bolton
and Whinston (1993). Rather than a limited number of upstream firms being able to hold-
up downstream firms, the limitation of this industry is the technology of the production
process. Preparation facilities need a steady flow of input to maintain efficiency and meet
external contracts. As a result, if their input flow is in jeopardy either due to riskiness of
shut-down or exit of input suppliers, this creates a clear incentive for them to buy up or
open mines in their vicinity to assure this base level of supply.
Although the exit of mines certainly increases riskiness of supply, it doesn’t appear that
shifts in the terms of trade are driving the increase in integration along the extensive
margin. Table 1.13 does a triple differences-in-differences approach splitting the sample by
small and large markets prior to the reform. The first definition of a small markets I use
is based on the number of mines in the market, specifically whether or not the market has
3 or less mines prior to the reform. The second definition uses the number of firms in the
market to determine whether the market is dominated by a few firms (the cutoff here is 3
or fewer firms). In markets that are smaller, mines shutting down could potentially leave
remaining mines with a greater ability to extract rents from preparation plants. Thus, to
avoid costly ex-post bargaining, preparation plants may choose to buy up mines. If this
was the case, one would expect the triple interaction term to be positive and significant
for smaller markets. In either specification, the coefficient is negative with varying levels
of significance. Thus, a hold-up story doesn’t appear to be consistent with the empirical
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results.
The increase in integration along the extensive margin does not carry over to measures
capturing the intensity of ownership. The reform had a negative impact on integration
in already integrated markets. Although initially surprising, this is consistent with the
increased liability of ownership that the new penalty structure imposed. Any citation
given to an operator of one mine counted against the history of violations and repeat
pattern of violations for all mines that they operated. These results are also consistent
with the growing trend of contract utilization seen in the industry (Buessing and Weil,
2013).
The nature of the mining industry is such that substituting to other production technology
is limited. Thus the incentive for ownership is affected in order to assure supply, but
only a base line supply is required and the other incentives of the reform pushed the
industry to disintegrate in already integrated markets. Although I can’t rule out every other
potential mechanism and theory, this story appears to be the most likely explanation given
the structure of the reform and the differences across extensive and intensive integration
decisions.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence for the role that regulations can play in organizational choices.
By utilizing a regulation that was unrelated to the current equilibrium structure of the
industry, I illustrated that government intervention can influence organizational choices.
The regulation increased costs of ownership and risk of shut down of underground op-
erations relative to surface. The increased variability in production influenced the local
preparation plants to choose to own a mine in markets most affected by the reform where
they previously hadn’t. This story is consistent with a modified supply assurance argu-
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ment. The reform also increased the liability of ownership such that the marginal benefit
of owning more than one mine dropped significantly, resulting in a decrease in the intensity
of ownership across markets already integrated prior to the reform.
In industries where high transaction costs exist in the local supply chain, regulations aimed
at outcomes such as health and safety or the environment have the potential to influence
firm structure. Integration is correlated with both efficiency gains and larger firms which
have positive implications for production and worker outcomes respectively. The inadver-
tent effects regulatory reforms have on organizational structure should be considered in the
construction and welfare effects of policies.
1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Underground and Surface Mining Methods
Notes:
[1] Depiction of mining methods comes from KGS (2006).
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Figure 1.2: Maps of US Mining Sites, 2005
Underground Mines Surface Mines
Notes:
[1] GPS coordinates for mining operations are from the "Mines Data Set" available through the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (website: http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/
OGIMSHA.asp). Coordinates have been verified and in sometimes corrected using the commercial
service Tele Atlas.
[2] Underground mines shown in this figure are actively producing operations in 2005 with a subunit
classification of underground. Similarly, surface mines are actively producing operations in 2005
with a subunit classification of strip, quarry, open pit, dredge or auger.
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Figure 1.3: Trends in Coal Costs by State of Origin
Notes:
[1] Author’s calculations using the FERC-923 form from the Energy Information Association (web-
site: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia423/).
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Figure 1.4: Mine Disasters, 1839 to 2013
Number of Fatalities Associated with Each Disaster
Notes:
[1] Fatality data is obtained from the National Institute for Occupational and Health Safety (website:
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/content/coaldisasters.html).
[2] The first line represents the quarter of the Sago Mine Disaster. The dashed line is the quarter
the MINER Act is passed into law. The dashed line is the quarter the increase to penalty amounts
are announced; the new penalties went into effect at the beginning of the next quarter (the second
quarter of 2007).
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Figure 1.5: Trends in Average Penalties, Pre and Post Reform
Notes:
[1] Author’s calculations using the "Violations Data Set" available through the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (website: http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/OGIMSHA.asp).
[2] The first line represents the quarter of the Sago Mine Disaster. The dashed line is the quarter
the MINER Act is passed into law. The dashed line is the quarter the increase to penalty amounts
are announced; the new penalties went into effect at the beginning of the next quarter (the second
quarter of 2007).
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Figure 1.6: Trends in Citations for Subsample of States, Pre and Post Reform
Notes:
[1] Author’s calculations using the "Violations Data Set" available through the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (website: http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/OGIMSHA.asp).
[2] The first line represents the quarter of the Sago Mine Disaster. The dashed line is the quarter
the MINER Act is passed into law. The dashed line is the quarter the increase to penalty amounts
are announced; the new penalties went into effect at the beginning of the next quarter (the second
quarter of 2007).
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Figure 1.7: Aerial View of Laurel Creek Operation, Pre and Post Mountaintop Mining
April 1996 July 2011
Notes:
[1] The Laurel Creek mining operations are located in Kirk, West Virginia. The area has been
mined extensively by a number of different companies over the years.
[2] Images were taken from Google Earth.
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Figure 1.8: Map of Sample Preparation Plants and Mines with Markets Superimposed,
2005
Notes:
[1] GPS coordinates for facilities and mines are from the "Mines Data Set" available through the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (website: http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/
OGIMSHA.asp). Coordinates have been verified and in sometimes corrected using the commercial
service Tele Atlas.
[2] A 10 kilometer radius has been superimposed around each preparation plant in the sample and
represents the potential supply market for that facility.
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Figure 1.9: Vertical Integration of Prep Plants Across Historically Mined and Not Mined
Samples
Notes:
[1] Author’s calculations using administrative records on facility and mine ownership obtained from
the Mine Safety and Health Administration. A preparation plant is considered vertically integrated
if it owns a mine within a 10 kilometer radius.
[2] The demarcation of whether or not a mine is near an 1880 railroad or river is determined by
whether or not a preparation facility is within 10 miles of one of these historic pathways. The
transport networks used here are provided by Atack et al. (2010).
[3] The first line represents the quarter of the Sago Mine Disaster. The dashed line is the quarter
the MINER Act is passed into law. The dashed line is the quarter the increase to penalty amounts
are announced; the new penalties went into effect at the beginning of the next quarter (the second
quarter of 2007).
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Figure 1.10: Mean Residuals of Vertical Integration Across Historically Mined and Not
Mined Samples
Notes:
[1] Author’s calculations using administrative records on facility and mine ownership obtained from
the Mine Safety and Health Administration. A preparation plant is considered vertically integrated
if it owns a mine within a 10 kilometer radius.
[2] The demarcation of whether or not a mine is near an 1880 railroad or river is determined by
whether or not a preparation facility is within 10 miles of one of these historic pathways. The
transport networks used here are provided by Atack et al. (2010).
[3] The first line represents the quarter of the Sago Mine Disaster. The dashed line is the quarter
the MINER Act is passed into law. The dashed line is the quarter the increase to penalty amounts
are announced; the new penalties went into effect at the beginning of the next quarter (the second
quarter of 2007).
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics: Characteristics of Local Markets
Not Near 1880 RR or River Near 1880 RR or River
Mean SD Mean SD
Pre-Reform: 2005
Integration Measures
PP Owns Mine in Radius 0.61 0.49 0.62 0.49
Percent of Total Prod. that is Owned Prod. 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.39
Percent of Total Mines are Owned 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.35
Percent Capacity Satisfied by Owned Mines 0.46 0.90 0.45 0.74
PP Characteristics
Ave. Employee Count 19.43 19.86 21.30 20.95
Year of Prep Plant 1978 16 1983 16
Average Cents per MMBTU Paid from County 230.15 25.01 206.79 42.43
Ave BTU of County 24.96 0.55 24.36 0.95
Ave Ash Content of County 11.01 1.62 11.61 2.03
Ave Sulfur Content ofCounty 1.14 0.46 1.61 0.82
Metallurgical Coal Beds in Market 0.85 0.36 0.52 0.50
Mine Counts
Number of Underground Mines 6.15 5.22 2.52 3.02
Number of Surface Mines 8.36 6.58 4.51 4.17
Number of Owned Underground Mines 1.24 2.06 0.72 1.15
Number of Owned Surface Mines 1.61 2.32 1.05 1.26
Mine Production
Production of Underground Mines 532096.07 565275.50 493000.16 785033.65
Production of Surface Mines 438318.82 545040.63 247015.03 405419.91
Production of Owned Underground Mines 160048.69 310147.44 278859.57 634862.80
Production of Owned Surface Mines 137870.68 343332.11 65667.60 173882.23
Observations 523 508
Post-Reform: 2007
Integration
PP Owns Mine in Radius 0.70 0.46 0.60 0.49
Percent of Total Prod. that is Owned Prod. 0.30 0.31 0.38 0.40
Percent of Total Mines are Owned 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.35
Percent Capacity Satisfied by Owned Mines 0.45 0.81 0.51 1.27
PP Characteristics
Ave. Employee Count 19.41 19.75 20.62 21.61
Year of Prep Plant 1978 17 1983 16
Average Cents per MMBTU Paid from County 227.94 21.96 207.00 34.08
Ave BTU of County 24.96 0.55 24.47 0.78
Ave Ash Content of County 10.94 1.48 11.31 1.90
Ave Sulfur Content ofCounty 1.03 0.28 1.59 0.86
Metallurgical Coal Beds in Market 0.85 0.35 0.59 0.49
Mine Counts
Number of Underground Mines 5.22 4.74 2.48 2.72
Number of Surface Mines 8.23 6.00 4.23 3.69
Number of Owned Underground Mines 1.30 1.94 0.75 1.11
Number of Owned Surface Mines 1.89 2.36 1.07 1.32
Mine Production
Production of Underground Mines 437201.73 477552.27 458763.62 737792.80
Production of Surface Mines 491698.29 637966.95 204069.32 367015.96
Production of Owned Underground Mines 130223.78 226241.24 255373.54 593586.84
Production of Owned Surface Mines 161751.21 356607.98 73784.24 184159.63
Observations 502 503
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Table 1.2: Change in the Number of Underground Mines in Response to the 2006 MINER
Act
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Quarterly Pre and Post
Count Count Max Count Min Count Mean Count
Dep Variable: Number of Underground Mines within 10km of a Preparation Plant
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform -0.562*** -0.560*** -0.514** -0.517** -0.549***
(0.206) (0.206) (0.212) (0.200) (0.202)
Reform -0.209* -0.255** -0.300** -0.131 -0.206*
(0.117) (0.122) (0.127) (0.104) (0.115)
Constant 2.169 2.276 -1.993 -5.474 -2.852
(2.365) (2.427) (6.354) (7.254) (6.467)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No No
Mean of Dep. Var 4.12 4.12 4.31 3.64 3.97
N 1785 1785 554 554 554
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] All regressions include preparation plant fixed effects.
[2] Local markets are defined as the 10km radius around each individual prep plant.
[3] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Table 1.3: The Relationship Between Exit and Injuries
Total Injuries Traumatic Injuries
main
Exiting Mines*Not
Near 1880 Transport 1.161 1.446*
(0.191) (0.308)
Exiting Mines 0.956 0.864 0.965 0.739*
(0.076) (0.115) (0.094) (0.135)
Not Near 1880
Transport 1.072 1.034 1.135 1.057
(0.088) (0.099) (0.106) (0.110)
N 1756 1756 1756 1756
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] The table reports IRR (incidence rate ratio) coefficients for the coefficient on VI in
the negative binomial regression on the various injury outcomes. The exposure term is
the hours worked and the standard errors are clustered at the mine level.
[2] All regressions control for mine age, state and quarter dummies, mine size, mine type
union status, number of coal beds and average thickness of the bed.
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Table 1.4: Impact on Vertical Integration in Local Markets of 2006 MINER Act
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Quarterly Pre and Post
Maximum Minimum
Vertically Vertically Vertical Vertical
Integrated Integrated Integration Integration
Panel A: OLS
Treated*Reform 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.162***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047)
Reform -0.025 0.002 -0.055* -0.024
(0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032)
Treated -0.050 -0.051 -0.040 -0.075
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062)
Constant -0.777 -0.835 -0.864 -0.766
(1.066) (1.073) (1.272) (1.306)
N 1785 1785 554 554
Panel B: Fixed Effects
Treated*Reform 0.073** 0.073** 0.050 0.087**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.042)
Reform -0.012 -0.002 -0.025 -0.010
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
Constant -0.271 -0.427 -1.687 -1.404
(0.729) (0.770) (2.385) (1.959)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 1785 1785 554 554
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within
the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost,
quality, and chemical composition.
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Table 1.5: Impact on Vertical Integration in Local Markets of 2006 MINER Act
Treatment Group Determined by Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Quarterly Pre and Post
Maximum Minimum
Vertically Vertically Vertical Vertical
Integrated Integrated Integration Integration
Panel A: OLS
Continuous Dist
From River*Reform 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Reform -0.014 -0.034 -0.043 -0.017
(0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036)
Continuous Dist
From River -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.639 -0.673 -0.664 -0.480
(1.047) (1.053) (1.245) (1.278)
N 1785 1785 554 554
Panel B: Fixed Effects
Continuous Dist
From River*Reform 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Reform -0.011 -0.033 -0.016 -0.015
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030)
Constant -0.163 -0.298 -1.583 -1.001
(0.743) (0.774) (2.441) (1.983)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 1785 1785 554 554
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within
the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost,
quality, and chemical composition.
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Table 1.6: Impact of 2006 MINER Act on Alternative Measures of Integration Among
Markets Integrated in 2005
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Percent of Production Capacity Owned
Quarterly Pre and Post
Mean Median
Treated*Reform -0.795* -0.903** -1.145** -1.125***
(0.393) (0.298) (0.368) (0.000)
Reform 1.071** 1.360*** 1.429*** 1.304***
(0.380) (0.260) (0.277) (0.000)
Constant 1.757 -3.639 -0.445 1.120***
(4.964) (6.965) (1.169) (0.000)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 50 50 16 16
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine
within the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average
cost, quality, and chemical composition.
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Table 1.7: Impact on 2006 MINER Act on Vertical Integration, Robustness Checks
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Quarterly Pre and Post
Maximum Minimum
Vertically Vertically Vertical Vertical
Integrated Integrated Integration Integration
Panel A: All Preparation Plants East of Mississippi
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform 0.077** 0.077** 0.054 0.090**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036)
Reform -0.020 -0.007 -0.032* -0.011
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Constant -0.099 -0.205 -1.077 -0.906
(0.592) (0.614) (1.876) (1.542)
N 2234 2234 695 695
Panel B: In Sample in 2005
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform 0.073** 0.073** 0.050 0.087**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.042)
Reform -0.012 -0.008 -0.025 -0.010
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026)
Constant -0.277 -0.437 -1.684 -1.404
(0.733) (0.774) (2.386) (1.960)
N 1722 1722 527 527
Panel C: Built Before 1995
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform 0.094** 0.094** 0.081* 0.110**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.052)
Reform -0.024 -0.017 -0.035 -0.026
(0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.037)
Constant -1.035 -1.162 -2.618 -2.399
(0.992) (1.043) (3.629) (2.991)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 1349 1349 410 410
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within
the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost,
quality, and chemical composition.
[4] All regressions are run with preparation plant fixed effects.
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Table 1.8: Impact on 2006 MINER Act on Vertical Integration, Robustness Checks
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Quarterly Pre and Post
Maximum Minimum
Vertically Vertically Vertical Vertical
Integrated Integrated Integration Integration
Panel A: Determining Treatment Group with Only 1880 Riverways and Railroads
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform 0.076** 0.077** 0.056 0.096**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.044)
Reform -0.025 -0.014 -0.037 -0.030
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.035)
Constant -0.215 -0.372 -1.574 -1.214
(0.738) (0.778) (2.410) (1.970)
N 1785 1785 554 554
Panel B: 5 Kilometer Local Market
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform 0.056 0.055 0.044 0.074
(0.042) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046)
Reform 0.002 0.012 -0.021 0.007
(0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant 0.047 -0.115 -0.821 -0.087
(0.706) (0.726) (2.178) (1.771)
N 1781 1781 553 553
Panel C: 15 Kilometer Local Market
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform 0.067** 0.067** 0.028 0.087**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.040)
Reform -0.022 -0.022 -0.037* -0.027
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026)
Constant 0.075 -0.033 -1.121 -0.716
(0.601) (0.637) (1.991) (1.509)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 1788 1788 555 555
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within
the distance of 10km or the radius specified in panel.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost,
quality, and chemical composition.
[4] All regressions are run with preparation plant fixed effects.
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Table 1.9: Impact of 2006 MINER Act on Alternative Measures of Integration
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Percent of Production Owned Percent of Mines Owned
Quarterly Pre and Post Quarterly Pre and Post
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: OLS
Treated*Reform 0.013 0.013 0.038 0.034 0.023 0.023 0.044 0.046*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Reform 0.039* 0.052** 0.018 0.013 0.019 0.041* -0.000 -0.005
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Treated -0.051 -0.052 -0.057 -0.056 -0.041 -0.042 -0.051 -0.052
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Constant -0.529 -0.555 -0.563 -0.520 -0.460 -0.507 -0.418 -0.355
(0.897) (0.903) (1.026) (1.056) (0.754) (0.758) (0.882) (0.888)
N 1785 1785 554 554 1785 1785 554 554
Panel B: Fixed Effects
Treated*Reform 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Reform 0.027* 0.041** 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.040** 0.016 0.013
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Constant -0.523 -0.620 -1.245 -1.328 -0.304 -0.459 -0.785 -0.673
(0.495) (0.524) (1.206) (1.223) (0.468) (0.495) (1.172) (1.225)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No No Yes No No
N 1785 1785 554 554 1785 1785 554 554
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost, quality, and chemical composition.
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Table 1.10: Impact of 2006 MINER Act on Alternative Measures of Integration
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Percent of Production Capacity Owned
Quarterly Pre and Post
Mean Median
Treated*Reform -0.089 -0.087 -0.077 -0.075
(0.078) (0.078) (0.072) (0.075)
Reform 0.056 0.077 0.049 0.046
(0.074) (0.074) (0.068) (0.071)
Constant -0.353 -0.568 -1.901 -2.087
(0.533) (0.544) (1.331) (1.388)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 1785 1785 554 554
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine
within the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average
cost, quality, and chemical composition.
49
Table 1.11: Impact of 2006 MINER Act on Alternative Measures of Integration Among
Markets Integrated in 2005
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Pre Period: 2005, Post Period: 2007Q2-Q4
Percent of Production Owned Percent of Mines Owned
Quarterly Pre and Post Quarterly Pre and Post
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: OLS
Treated*Reform 0.064 0.089 0.037 0.026 0.044 0.075 -0.018 -0.105
(0.150) (0.200) (0.228) (0.188) (0.075) (0.140) (0.090) (0.113)
Reform 0.158 0.177 0.175 0.147 0.151* 0.043 0.211*** 0.279***
(0.133) (0.244) (0.190) (0.127) (0.079) (0.146) (0.032) (0.035)
Treated 0.131 0.179* 0.311 0.280 0.297** 0.361*** 0.538*** 0.515***
(0.105) (0.094) (0.216) (0.187) (0.123) (0.086) (0.092) (0.113)
Constant 9.132** 10.045*** 17.553* 12.398 15.017*** 16.524*** 25.241*** 22.141***
(2.993) (2.349) (8.697) (7.546) (3.986) (2.415) (4.048) (4.835)
N 50 50 16 16 50 50 16 16
Panel B: Fixed Effects
Treated*Reform -0.151 -0.234** -0.404*** -0.459*** -0.149 -0.185*** -0.258** -0.418***
(0.161) (0.088) (0.120) (0.000) (0.083) (0.053) (0.088) (0.000)
Reform 0.237 0.357 0.615*** 0.642*** 0.197** 0.202 0.448*** 0.615***
(0.146) (0.226) (0.090) (0.000) (0.061) (0.200) (0.066) (0.000)
Constant -9.779 -12.800 2.134*** 2.729*** -3.641 -5.788 2.568*** 3.303***
(6.034) (9.358) (0.382) (0.000) (5.843) (9.271) (0.278) (0.000)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No No Yes No No
N 50 50 16 16 50 50 16 16
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost, quality, and chemical composition.
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Table 1.12: Falsification Test
Treatment Group Determined by Historical RR’s and Waterways
Quarterly Pre and Post
Maximum Minimum
Vertically Vertically Vertical Vertical
Integrated Integrated Integration Integration
Panel A: Pre Period: 2003, Post Period: 2005Q2-Q4
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform -0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.045
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046)
Reform 0.008 0.023 0.004 0.070
(0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044)
Constant 0.168 0.139 0.062 -0.576
(0.256) (0.259) (0.529) (0.628)
N 1790 1790 560 560
Panel B: Pre Period: 2000, Post Period: 2002Q2-Q4
Not Near 1880
Transport*Reform -0.001 -0.001 -0.023 0.051
(0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.049)
Reform -0.477 -0.490 0.233 -0.429
(0.405) (0.407) (0.629) (0.639)
Constant 1.058** 1.068** 0.087 1.794**
(0.467) (0.471) (0.886) (0.879)
Quarter Dummies No Yes No No
N 1753 1753 573 573
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[1] A preparation plant is vertically integrated if it owns a mine within
the distance of 10km.
[2] The states included in this analysis are : Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
[3] All regressions are run with controls for facility size, county average cost,
quality, and chemical composition.
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Chapter 2
Impact of Contracting on Occupational Injuries
and Fatalities in Underground Coal Mining
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2.1 Introduction
Contractor utilization in underground coal mining has experienced sustained growth over
the past 25 years. Some contractors are used in mining to undertake specialized tasks
in underground and above ground operations. Subcontracting of this variety provides for
gains in specialization to the operator and in terms of economic efficiency more broadly.
But contracting has also been used as a means of shifting liability for pension and health
obligations of union mine operators to other entities; to lower the cost of civil penalties
arising from violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act; and to avoid other employment
related costs. More generally, contracting can be a means of shifting legal liability to low
capitalized entities as a means of reducing costs associated with potential torts. When
contracting is used to pursue the latter ends, social costs can be significant.
This paper examines the changing incidence of contracting in underground mining, and
examines its consequences on a particularly salient social cost in underground mining:
exposure to health and safety risks. To explore whether a relationship between contractor
utilization and health and safety outcomes exist, we use detailed data from the Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA). To do this we first examine whether contractors are
more risky entities as compared to mine operators in accomplishing the task of extracting
coal. We then consider if contractor utilization reveals any behavioral characteristics about
the operator shifting out specific tasks. The impact on health and safety of both types of
contracting channels is relevant for regulatory policy.
To identify the association of the use of contracting with health and safety outcomes, we use
publicly available Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) datasets and data from
the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Independent contractors and operators are
tracked in the Accident, Illness and Injury and Employment Self-Extracting Files (known
as Part 50 Data). Additionally, mine level data is available through the Open Government
Initiative. These datasets contain information on injuries, employment, production and
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geographic location. The contract mines, otherwise referred to as captive contractors, are
not tracked by MSHA and require additional assumptions to determine their prevalence in
the industry.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the role of contracting
in the underground mining industry and the reasons that this organizational form might
lead to increased health and safety risks for workers. Section 2.3 provides information
on the data and the definitions of key variables of interest. Section 2.4 provides the core
results on the growth and prevalence of contracting, the association of contractor use and
health and safety outcomes, and robustness checks of the estimates. Section 2.5 concludes
with implications for public policy.
2.2 Fissured Employment, Contracting, and Consequences
The central question addressed in this paper is the impact of firm operational decisions with
respect to contracting on the health and safety risks faced by workers who are responsible
to undertaking the tasks specified by the contracting party. The fashion in which work
is contracted has been shown to have impacts on the health and safety risk exposure in
petrochemical (Rebitzer, 1995; U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 1990; Kochan et al., 1991); construction (Azari-Rad et al., 2003); trucking
(James et al., 2007); and cell towers (Day and Knutson 2012). It is therefore important to
understand the varieties and underlying reasons for different forms of contracting.
Weil (2014) argues that workplace organization in a growing number of industries is char-
acterized by "fissured employment" where companies shift out successive layers of activities
once undertaken within the boundaries of the firm outward. Fissured employment began
with corporate functions like payroll, IT, publications, and human resources. Over time,
it moved to operational activities like maintenance, janitorial services, and security. But
55
in many cases, firms continue to shift out activities once regarded as central to business
function, such as room cleaning and facility maintenance in hotels, installation in the ca-
ble industry, tower construction and maintenance in telecommunication, and operation of
distribution functions in retail.
In underground coal mining, many types of activities were historically done by specialized
contractors, similar to the use of specialty contractors in construction. In the industry,
independent contractors are defined as "any person, partnership, corporation, firm associ-
ation or other organization that contracts to perform services or construction at a mine."
A different type of independent contracting became more prevalent beginning in the late
1990s. Contract mine operators undertook core mining activities in the coal mine that had
been formerly undertaken by the employees of coal operators. Contract coal operators are
typically smaller firms hired by the primary coal operator to extract coal. The contract
coal operator is paid a price for the coal extracted under the contract, often leasing the
equipment and mining rights from that larger entity.1
The arrangement requires a large number of small contractors willing to undertake the
mining work. This appeared not to be a problem for major coal companies in the 1990s.
For example, in a series of investigative reports, Paul Nyden reported that Massey Coal, one
of the largest mine operators of that period, used 500 contractors in Appalachia between
the early 1980s and mid-1990s. An abundance of small operators-sometimes family-owned
enterprises with few assets of their own, other times companies that had become declared
1The use of subcontracting to undertake basic mining operations beyond specialty applications is often
attributed to the A.T. Massey Coal Company. The "Massey Doctrine" was based on classifying coal reserves
held by the company into three groups: Reserves with high quality coal, in thick seams and good mining
conditions; coal in reserves with seams of average height or mining conditions; and reserves with thin
seams and difficult mining conditions. The company would own and operate mines of the first type and
use subsidiaries or contractors for the second type, while still maintaining some level of control and stake
in them. The third type of reserve would be mined using the contracting relationship described above.
According to an internal Massey document, for the third tier of reserves, "We [Massey] desire to have only a
brokerage relationship with... no long-term contractual or financial arrangement. This is the coal that, in a
weak market, will be available at the lower price... This is the coal that we should buy or market ourselves
rather than have it compete with us." Massey Document quoted in Weil (2014).
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bankruptcy under a different name-bid for the opportunity to work as contractors.2
The various forms of contracting provide a mine’s controlling entity with many options in
regard to how it chooses to extract coal. The mine controller, MC, can either have an owned
operator, OO, run the day-to-day operations or can contract out to a contract operator,
CO. Both owned subsidiaries and contract operations can choose to either perform all tasks
in house, IH, or hire independent contractors, IC. Thus a multi-level decision tree emerges
in terms of employment hierarchy. This is shown below.
MC
CO
ICIH
OO
ICIH
This sort of structure is not inherently problematic. There are many economic and op-
erational reasons to own or to contract out work. There are two principal problems that
may arise, however. First, organizational choices may be taken to avoid regulatory costs
as well as employment and environmental liabilities. Second, the method of contracting
may give rise to negative externalities if the party making the contracting decision (MC or
OO) does not fully face the costs arising from different methods of extracting coal. The
following sections address the various reasons that both problems may be present in the
context of underground coal mining.
2.2.1 Specialization and comparative advantage
If one considers the universe of all the contractors in coal mining, many do work unre-
lated to coal extraction. Table 2.1 depicts the different categories of contractors active in
2These practices were documented in a series of investigative reports by Paul Nyden, published in
the Charleston Gazette between 1993-1995 documenting in detail the increasing use of subcontracting in
underground coal mining. See Nyden, "Coal Contracts: Shifting Mining Danger, Responsibility." Charleston
Gazette, November 7, 1993 . Nyden also reported that 80 percent of the 250 contractors used by Island
Creek Coal Company, another major coal producer in the 1990s, were out of business by 1993.
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underground coal mining during the period 1988-2010.3 These include drilling, blasting,
trucking, welding, plumbing, and air quality / ventilation.
The impetus for this type of specialized contracting arises from the benefits of specializa-
tion: contracting out the trucking of coal means the mining company doesn’t have to buy
a fleet of trucks, maintain them, find drivers, and follow protocols and safety standards
specific to the trucking industry. Being an efficient mining operation does not necessarily
translate into being an efficient trucking enterprise, thus there are likely gains from expertise
and scale from contracting out this task. Even if one limits the discussion to independent
contractors doing work in underground operations, there are examples of specialized con-
tractors. For instance, engineering, air quality and certain non-routine construction tasks
are not positions that it would necessarily make sense for a mine to have on staff full-time.
The activities undertaken by this class of specialized contractors probably represent a
range of risk levels: from lower injury risk work in air quality and certain surface area
management activities, to the inherently more dangerous activities undertaken by blasting
specialists. Separately, mine operators may vary in how they oversee and manage specialty
contractors. The coordination undertaken by the mine operator can reduce or increase
the risks. We attempt to separate out the effects of the inherent risks of contracting
certain types of activities from the impacts of coordination / supervisor activity of those
contractors below.
2.2.2 Avoiding collective bargaining liabilities and regulatory costs
Contracting out may arise from the incentives to contract out extraction to avoid either his-
toric costs associated with collective bargaining for union mines or more generally to avoid
regulatory costs associated with health and safety, environmental, and other regulations.
3Company information is extracted from the company names as no official description of the type of
work is gathered from the contractors other than what subunit of a mine they worked in.
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Mining is a highly regulated industry due to the historic problems with worker health and
safety (Fishback and Kantor, 2001; Fishback, 2007). Due to the high rates of injuries, all
mining operations face significant costs for state-level workers compensation. These rates
are imperfectly related to injury experience, making operators with lower injury rates
often implicitly subsidize those with high injury rates. Shifting to contract operations
can therefore reduce exposure to worker compensations premiums faced by larger coal
operators. This can shift the costs of workers compensation to the public since smaller and
marginal operators historically are more likely to fall behind in their required payments
into the system.4
In the early 1990s, unionized mine controllers and operators used contracting to shift ac-
cumulated healthcare and pension obligations to other parties (Crandall et al., 1998). By
contracting out mining operations, a union coal operator distances itself from coal miners
formerly in its direct employ, thereby divesting itself from a set of liabilities associated
with contractual requirements ranging from accumulated vacation days to, more signifi-
cantly, long term health care and pension obligations. Pioneered by A.T. Massey Coal
Company, coal operators following the "Massey Doctrine" (described below) were often
able to shift employment of longstanding employees to the small contractors who assumed
the obligations for future health care and pension obligations.5 They did so by requiring
the contractor to hire from a "panel" of former employees (often union workers) of the
lead company. This made the contractor the "last signatory operator" for whom the miner
worked, thereby transferring the lifetime obligations created under the collective bargaining
agreements (as well as other health care obligations under the Mine Safety and Health Act)
4Once work had been shifted to contractors, Massey, Island Creek, and other coal operators had little
incentive to insure that their contractors contributed required payments to either state funds or, where
appropriate, union funds. As a result, Massey and Island Creek owed up to $120 million to the West
Virginia Workers’ Compensation Fund, and over $50 million to UMWA Health and Retirement funds. See
Nyden, "Mining Contractors Owe Millions in Fees, Fines, Wages." Charleston Gazette, December 26, 1993,
p. 1.
5It also insulates the mining company from any concerted worker activity focused at the lead company,
since it no longer is the direct employer, making such actions a violation of the National Labor Relations
Act prohibition of secondary boycotts.
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to the contractor.6 In essence, contracting of this type provides a mechanism to subvert
a variety of long term commitments to miners and their families negotiated over decades
between the UMWA and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association. A lawyer involved
in environmental litigation in contracting cases remarked that "Depending on specific cir-
cumstances, a large company can shift between $3 and $5 (in costs) for each ton of coal
mined from its shoulders onto the small mine operator or society at large."7
This issue is still evident today. Patriot Coal was spun off from Peabody Coal in 2007 and
received 40% of its pension liabilities but only 16% of its assets. This meant that 90% of
Patriot’s employees had never worked there and that the company has 3 times the number
of retirees than it did miners.8 A 2013 court ruling let Patriot coal reduce pension benefits
in lieu of going bankrupt; whereas Peabody is one of the most profitable coal companies
in the country (Kary, 2013).
Finally, subcontracting can benefit large employers by reducing prospective penalties for
violations of health and safety standards. Under the Mine Safety and Health Act, active
mine operations are visited four times a year for regular inspections. If an inspection leads
to a violation, there are follow-up inspection visits until the violation is sufficiently resolved.
Often, these follow-up visits also lead to more violations. At some larger operations,
inspectors are at the mine sites almost daily. In addition, MSHA has the power to close a
mine or section if there is a clear and present danger or if the mine operator has failed to
abate a significant citation repeatedly. A change in law in response to a number of high
profile mining accidents in 2006 further increased violations and penalties under the Act.
The costs associated with compliance (or failure to comply) can represent a substantial
6The use of subcontracting also created opportunities to avoid clean-up responsibilities under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and other environmental laws. This became and remains a
very active area of environmental litigation for the Environmental Protection Agency and the US Depart-
ment of Justice.
7Thomas Galloway, quoted in Paul Nyden, "Coal Contracts: Shifting Mining Danger, Responsibility."
Sunday Gazette-Mail, November 7, 1993, p.5.
8Patriot had also bought Magnum a spin off of Arch Coal in 2005 which had similarly had taken on a
considerable amount of of Arch’s pension liabilities. Thus, the company had additional pension liabilities
from this earlier purchase (Kary and Elmquist, 2012).
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operational costs (Buessing, 2014).
Consider the example of the Ember Contracting Corporation. Ember Contracting Corpo-
ration went out of business in 2009 after their line of credit was canceled due to a high level
of debt they had accrued by not paying MSHA penalties. It sold its mining equipment
to EC Management whose owners also owned Ember. These same two owners started a
second contracting operation in the beginning of 2010 called GR Mining which conducted
business in the same location as Ember and hired many of the same employees. This tran-
sition from one contracting operation to another was done in an attempt to avoid paying
MSHA penalties of over $200,000 by claiming the burden of the penalties was too high for
the operation. Not only did Ember avoid paying real penalty costs of over $200,000 while
in business that a subsidiary of a larger entity would have to pay, they attempted to avoid
the legal ramifications of doing this by using a shell company.
2.2.3 Tort and undercapitalized firms
The nature of the relationship between the parties to a subcontracting relationship affects
the apportionment of liability. If a "right to control" is established, an organization can
be held liable for the actions of its subcontractors. But if a subcontractor undertakes its
activities largely under its own direction (that is, acts as an independent contractor), the
party which hired it is far less likely to be held liable for bad outcomes that may arise.
Vicarious liability refers to liability imposed upon one party because of the actions of
another. Vicarious liability requires establishing that a principal party had the capacity
to control the activity of its agent if it is to be held liable. As a result, exposure to being
held vicariously liable for the actions of a subordinate party affects the degree to which the
principal attempts to influence behavior by asserting more direct control over the agents’
activities. Imagine a mine operator that decides to contract with a small contract operator
to undertake extraction rather than directly employing its own workforce. The question
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is how to manage the contractor in order to meet the operator’s production goals while
taking advantage of the competitive for contractor services.
Considerations about vicarious liability compound the basic decision problem facing an
operator facing a contracting opportunity: on one hand, an operator has an incentive to
have its contractors adhere to a set of standards, practices, and procedures central to its
business strategy. On the other hand, it will want to have competition among multiple
parties who undertake the task while not itself engaging in any supervision that could
be construed as "directing and controlling" those parties to the extent it could be held
vicariously liable.
This creates very complicated and contradictory incentives. Shielding itself from vicarious
liability creates incentives for the lead organization to exert as little control over its agents
as possible, even in cases where it would be more socially efficient for it to do so. In fact, the
incentives become even more problematic: if subcontractors are financially viable (solvent),
they will be exposed to the costs imposed by their mistakes or accidents. Although the lead
company is not liable in such an instance, contractors will end up forcing it to bear some
of these potential costs in the form of higher prices up front. However, if the contractors
are financially unstable, they become "judgment-proof"-that is, they will not face the costs
of tort actions brought against them, because they will have few or no assets to claim.
Such insolvent subcontractors will therefore price their services at a lower level. Hence,
lead companies have incentives not only to shift their risk through contracting but also to
select agents who are more likely to behave poorly because of their judgment-proof status
(Rebitzer, 1995;Arlen and MacLeod, 2005).
Contract operations can provide benefits arising from regulatory avoidance even if costs are
similar to using an in-house subsidiary. But it is often the case that costs are not similar
across the two entities. Contract and small operations are more likely to be undercapital-
ized. Thus, they can provide the same services for lower cost because they are not paying
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the full operation costs. Contract operators in the 1990s were often undercapitalized and
operating under tight margins. Turnover among this group was high: Between 1980 and
1993, Island Creek Coal, hired 60 different contractors to operate a small number of small
mines in Elk Creek, West Virginia. Of the 60, 52 were out of business by the end of the
period, with nine filing for bankruptcy. A similar percentage of Massey’s contractors went
out of business over the same period.
Anecdotal evidence from the period where contract operations grew suggests an association
between that practice and increased fatality risk. From 1980 to 1993, 38 men were killed in
mines affiliated with A.T. Massey Coal and Island Creek Coal, the two companies profiled
in Paul Nyden’s investigative series. Even though the majority of coal was extracted from
mines operated directly by those two companies, 27 of the deaths (or 72 percent) occurred
in contract mines operating under those companies.9
2.3 Data and Measurement
2.3.1 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis come from two main sources: the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) and the Energy Information Administration (EIA).
• MSHA Part 50 Data: These data provide quarterly information for all operators
and contractors working in mining from 1988 to the present. The data provide em-
ployment, production and injury measures associated with work in specific subunits
of mining operations.10
• MSHA Open Government Initiative Data: MSHA also collects extensive data
9Paul Nyden, "Small Mines Shunt Safety Concerns for Large Profits." Sunday Gazette-Mail, December
19, 1993, p. 1.
10The self-extracting files containing this data are available at:
http://www.msha.gov/stats/part50/p50y2k/p50y2k.htm
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at the mine level on every inspection, violations and all reported injuries.11 12 The
authors also obtained complete administrative records on changes in mine and facility
operation statuses, as well as changes to controllers and operators going back in
some cases to the late 70’s.13 Additionally, MSHA reports quarterly production, and
employment. Information on GPS locations and addresses are also available but have
been verified and expanded for the purpose of this analysis.14
• EIA Form 7A Data: The EIA conducts a yearly survey (EIA Form-7A) to gather
information on mine characteristics for operations that produced 10,000 or more short
tons of coal and/or employed workers for 5,000 hours or more. The authors obtained
restricted variables gathered in the survey such as seam height and number of beds
which provide important geographical/exogenous controls.
2.3.2 Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables
2.3.2.1 Injury Rates
We focus on three safety outcomes: fatalities, total number of injuries and the number
of traumatic injuries. When considering injury measures as an outcome, it is also worth
addressing the issue of reporting bias. Fatalities are the least likely of the measures to be
misreported and cannot be easily masked because of multiple reporting channels and the
presence of MSHA. But, fatalities are rare occurrences and typically there is not enough
11Injury counts for contractors across the two datasets match except for 8 cases, which are small in terms
of the size of the discrepancy.
12The specific datasets used are the following: "Accident Injuries Data Set", "Employment/Production
Data Set (Quarterly)", "Inspections Data Set", "Mine Addresses of Record Data Set", and "Violations Data
Set."
13The Open Government Initiative data can be obtained at:
http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/OGIMSHA.asp.
Historical administrative records required to determine operation and ownership histories were requested
from MSHA by the authors.
14The author used Tele Atlas to fill in missing address information. Tele Atlas has a commercial service
arm that performs this service. Tele Atlas is one of the world’s top mapping and navigation data companies
and is a subsidiary of TomTom.
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statistical power to link company characteristics to fatality rates. On the other end of the
spectrum, the total injury rate measure is the most likely to suffer from reporting bias as
some injuries can be addressed without going to a hospital or are likely outside a mining
environment. There are a number of reasons a mine may choose to not report injuries,
including lowering workers compensation premiums which are (imperfectly) experience
rated, and potentially raising the probability of inspection. Since some of these motivations
are correlated with reasons to contract out work, its use as a dependent variable might be
problematic. The traumatic injury measure is taken from Morantz (2013). Traumatic
injuries avoid some of the issues of reporting bias as they are injuries particularly difficult
to hide and are more obviously associated with mining. They are more prevalent than
fatalities, but less likely to suffer from the bias problems arising from total injury rates.15
Injuries in this industry, particularly fatalities, follow a negative binomial distribution. As
a result all the specifications used in this analysis account for the skewed count structure
of the data.16 Rather than presenting the regression coefficients, we use the Incidence Rate
Ratio (IRR) for ease of exposition. An IRR greater than one implies an increased risk of
incidence and an IRR less than one corresponds to a reduced risk. The standard errors
listed in parenthesis are the standard errors for the coefficients and not the IRR.
2.3.2.2 Contractor Identification
As discussed in the introduction, there are two types of relevant independent contractors:
specialized contractors and contract operators. MSHA’s Part 50 Data allows for contractors
to be identified, but the information is not linked to the specific mine they are working in
at a point in time. The Part 50 Data therefore is the universe of contractors, including
15The injuries included in this measure are:bites and stings, amputations, enucleations, fractures and
chips, cuts and lacerations, punctures, burns/scalds, including chemical, electrical and laser burns. See
Morantz (2013) for a full description on the justification for the use of these particular injury descriptions.
16The negative binomial regression is the method most commonly used by other researchers looking at
this industry (Morantz, 2013).
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both specialized and some contract operators. This presents two data issues: linking the
contractor to a particular mine at a particular point in time; and distinguishing contract
operators from other types of contractors.
MSHA quarterly data on mine activity, injury outcomes, and other characteristics do not
identify all contractors present at the time of an inspection. As a result, the only way to
be sure a contractor worked at a specific mine is if it received a violation at the time of
an inspection. This introduces a bias for any analysis that looks at mines as the unit of
observation, since the more dangerous a contractor, the more likely it will appear in the
data. Of the 1502 contractor’s working at an underground subunit code at some point
during the period 2000 to 2010, 476 received a citation.17
Since the Part 50 Data do not directly categorize the type of work engaged by the contrac-
tor, we use the names in the MSHA Part 50 data as a first approximation of the underlying
activity undertaken by the contractor, leaving the residual unidentified set of contractors
as the pool of likely contract operators.
2.4 Results
In general, multi-tiered subcontractor and related organizational forms can create coordi-
nation failures, particularly where it is superimposed on complicated and risky production
processes (Perrow, 1984). When the steps of production are broken into activities overseen
by different business organizations, the actions of workers of one employer are more likely
to create risks for the workforce of another. This has been a long-standing problem in
construction (Azari-Rad et al., 2003).
17There are a number of contractors that receive violations at underground mines that are not associated
with extraction (particularly a number of trucking companies). The violation data isn’t reported at the
subunit level which means violations received at the surface of underground operations are included as
underground violations. Thus the universe of underground contractors we consider is based on those that
reported doing underground work in the Part 50 Data and we only consider violations that mines receive
attributed to these contractors.
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Significant externalities therefore may arise from contracting arrangements in coal mining.
By fragmenting the employment relationship, certain important decisions that do not di-
rectly affect the costs of any of the operator or contractor involved fall through the cracks.
Complex systems that underlie production require coordination. By carving up employ-
ment among many parties, the problem of coordination increases. And when coordination
fails, accidents happen.18
In order to examine the relation of contracting and health and safety outcomes, we break
our empirical investigation into several stages. We begin by looking at the evidence for
increased contractor utilization over time and discuss the empirical difficulties in measuring
contractor operators. We then decompose the consequences of contracting into four com-
ponents. First, we examine whether contractors expose their workforce to a higher level
of health and safety risk than otherwise comparable operators who undertake similar work
in-house. Second, we analyze whether the operators who engage in contracting out work
are themselves more dangerous than operators who do not contract out work. We examine
whether operators with histories of prior violations of MSHA are associated with higher
risks when using contractors than operators with lower violation histories when using con-
tractors. Finally, we determine if areas with higher contractor presence are associated with
higher injury rates.
18The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2009 is a prime example of this: the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board investigative team concluded in the summer of 2012 that a principal cause of that workplace and
environmental disaster arose from coordination failure among the three organizations responsible for the
drilling. The Chemical Safety Board noted a number of such deficiencies, including those related to the
linkages between the hazard assessment systems of BP and its subordinate organization on the Deepwater
Horizon, Transocean: "BP and Transocean hazard assessment systems were inadequate. For example, the
bridging document that sought to harmonize safety controls between BP and Transocean was a minimal
document that focused only on six personal safety issues such as minimum heights for employing fall
protection equipment." See U.S. Chemical Safety Board website for reports provided in the July 2012
hearing: (accessed September 1, 2012). This issue is discussed in greater detail in Weil (2014, Chapters 5
and 9).
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2.4.1 Contractor utilization
Contractor utilization has increased significantly in the past 25 years. Figure 2.1 presents
the number of registered contractors in underground coal mining, highlighting the relative
growth in utilization of contractors to operators since 1988. These represent the universe
of contractors operating in the industry, including specialized contractors (e.g. ventilation
companies) as well as some contract operations. Although contractors still undertake a
minority of total production, their share has risen considerably.
As a first approximation of focusing on contract operators specifically, the above set of
contractors can be roughly broken into specialized contractors (those doing drilling, blast-
ing, trucking, welding, etc.) from others who are not identified by a specialty activity. We
do so by using the name of the contractor listed in the MSHA Part 50 Data. The "All
Other" category should include contract operators but will also include other companies
with names that don’t easily identify the type of work they do. Figure 2.3 provides the
hours worked by type of contractor to illustrate the trends by type of work. Table 2.1
provides the percentages of number of contractors in each category over time; the trends
here are quite similar to Figure 2.3. There are two aspects worth emphasizing that are
evident in both the figure and table. The first is that the increase in contractor utilization
seems to be driven predominately by the "All Other" category. Secondly, it appears this
category begins taking off around 1994.
2.4.2 Association of contractors on health and safety outcomes:
The theory indicates multiple reasons for contractor utilization, some with negative and
some with positive effects for worker outcomes. Thus the following set of analyses try
to differentiate between these theories using the available data. At the same time, data
limitations require some of these theories to be explored by approaching the question from
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multiple angles. The first analysis determines whether contractors are utilized to do spe-
cific work and whether this work is particularly risky. An analysis comparing contractors
to operators directly highlights if there are general difference in worker outcomes across the
two types of firms and whether that can be explained by the type of work being performed
[Company-level Analysis]. Another explanation is that contractor utilization reveals some-
thing about the behavior of the firm choosing to contract out work. In these analyses, the
mine is the relevant observation and its relationship with contractors is examined. These
results are presented in the Mine-level Analysis. A bias is introduced in this analysis due
to the reporting of contractor utilization. To address this issue, a number of alternative
specifications are considered to show the validity of the results. Finally, we aggregate the
company-level data to a county-level [County-level Analysis]. Although we lose the preci-
sion and controls associated with the mine-level data, we reduce the reporting bias inherent
in the Mine-level Analysis. Each method used to parse out these theories has distinctive
limitations for interpretation. But together, the results provide a means of understanding
the relationship of contracting and health and safety outcomes of workers.
2.4.2.1 Company-level Analysis
Injury rates for contractors and operators have decreased since 1988 as illustrated by Figure
2.2. The upper panel of Figure 2.2 compares the traumatic injury rate for operators and
contractors. The lower panel of Figure 2.2 does a similar comparison of fatalities. Along
with the reduction in both traumatic and fatality incidence rates, it appears there is also
less volatility in the traumatic rates overtime. Despite the secular decline contractors
appear to have higher levels of traumatic measures, particularly in the last 10 years.
One explanation for the result is that the type of work being contracted out is more
dangerous than the work that is kept in house. Riskier tasks such as working with explosives
and blasting may require a higher degree of specialization and are contracted out as a
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result. Revisiting Figure 2.3 indicates that an increase in both "Construction" and "All
Other" has increased over time. Since construction tends to be a riskier industry, a relative
higher level of injury rate for contractors wouldn’t be necessarily surprising, but given the
corresponding increase in the "All Other" category, it indicates that perhaps contractors in
this category are worth examining further.
We look at the above relationship but using regression analysis to control for other ob-
servable factors that could be driving the relationship. Table 2.2 provides the statistical
relationship between the three injury rate measures and use of contractors. The first set of
regressions looks at all contractors regardless of type and indicates that when controlling
for hours, geographic effects and time trends, contractors are slightly safer than operators.
But when we split the analysis out by type of contractor, the story becomes more nuanced.
Riskier contractors are on average associated with higher injuries than operators.19 Spe-
cialized contractors in areas like engineering, air quality, equipment supply, etc... are
considerably less prone to injury. Both of these facts are intuitive given the type of work
that’s being done by the contracting entities. What’s worth noting is the positive rela-
tionship between contractors in the "All Other" category relative to mine operators. The
lack of precision for the estimates could be driven by the fact that there are likely other
types of contractors in this group that are doing another type of job which we couldn’t
discern using the company name. Another issue is the data collected at the company level
is missing many important covariates.
Although we cannot measure contract operations directly in this particular analysis, to
the extent that we are capturing some of these operations in the "All Other" category, the
growth of the "All Other" category is worrisome. The "All Other" category although vague
in terminology does appear to be capturing some well known contract operators. Ember
19The ideal comparison would be to compare a construction contractor to a mine operator when that
operator is doing construction rather than comparing it to a mine’s day-to-day activities. There’s no way
to do this but as a result, it can’t be inferred from these results that contracting out riskier work is bad.
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Contracting Corporation, discussed above, is one such entity. When researching the names
of other firms in the "All Other" category, a number appear to have a history of working
as mine operators.20 Although a definite link cannot be determined at this time, if "All
Other" is a good proxy for contract operations, then the results suggest liability avoidance
does lead to worse worker outcomes.
2.4.2.2 Mine-level Analysis
The company-level approach showed that on average contractors aren’t particularly riskier
than operators but this varies by the type of contracting work being done. It is then
worth understanding which operators are using contractors and particularly, which ones
are using risky contractors. As noted in Section 2.3, MSHA does not capture the presence
of contractors at a mine in a given quarter unless the contractor is issued a citation at the
time of an inspection. While identifying the presence of contract use on the basis of this
data is likely to be biased, it is useful to compare mines that have been cited with one or
more contractor violations during between 2000-2010 with mines that have never received
a citation.
Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics on injury outcomes and mine characteristics based
on contractor utilization (identified by the presence of a contractor with violations at a
mine at the time of an inspection). Table 2.3 shows significantly higher rates of all injury
measures for mines with one or more contractor violations versus mines with no contractor
violations. For example, traumatic injury rates were almost five times more likely among
mines with one or more contractor violations than those with no contractor violations
(1.18 versus 0.25). The table also indicates systematic differences between the two types
of mines. Those with contractor violations were far larger in terms of coal production,
employment, and use of capital equipment (MMUs). They also tended to be older and
203-D Mining Inc. out of Stanville, KY and Shady Lane Coal Corp. out of Grundy, WV are just a couple
more examples.
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active for longer periods of time.
Table 2.4 uses the quarterly mine level data with detailed information on mine character-
istics, and estimates the impact of contractor usage on the three safety outcomes. Related
to the classification in Table 2.3, a mine’s contractor status is based on whether a given
mine in a given quarter is associated with a contractor who committed a violation. If a vio-
lation by a contractor is documented at a mine, it is classified as using a contractor in that
quarter. The models also control for production, mine geologic characteristics (number
of coal beds and average thickness of coal seams), union status, use of specialized capital
equipment and operation type.
Table 2.4 indicates that among mines that use contractors for underground operations, the
likelihood of injury is higher across all measures, and significantly so for all but fatalities.
The risk of traumatic injury increases by 7% when a contractor violation is observed and
the risk of total injury increases by 6%. The coefficient on contractor utilization suggests
that the risk of fatality increases by 42% but the coefficient if marginally insignificant (the
pvalue is .103). Looking at the break out by type of contractor, most of this result is not
driven by high risk contractors but rather by the "All Other" category. That is, the use of
contractors, even ones doing risky work isn’t what’s determining the positive relationship
but rather its companies that are most likely doing the day-to-day extraction operations
that are associated with higher injury outcomes. This further reinforces the findings of the
Company-Level Analysis and not only shows that these entities are riskier but the mines
that choose to use them also appear riskier.
2.4.2.3 Mine-level Analysis - Robustness Checks
To address the potential bias introduced through this method of contractor identification,
the universe of contractors (as calculated from the Part 50 data) is examined. Table 2.5
presents descriptive statistic regarding the number of unique contractors and mines that
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received violations over the study period. The first three columns present the percentage of
the universe of underground coal mines that had a contractor violation per year (over the
entire period about 65% of mines used a contractor with a violation). The middle columns
are counts of the unique number of contractors who received a violation at a mine. The
final set of columns measure the number of unique mines where contractors received a
violation.21
Table 2.5 reveals that most mines only have one or two underground contractors at their
operation at a given time and most contractors only appear to work for one mine at a
time. Using this result, if a contractor is in the contractor database doing underground
work and at some point receives a violation associated with a mine, we assume that the
contractor was at that mine for the entire length of time that they were in the contractor
database.22 While this is a strong assumption, it more accurately reflects the likely presence
of a contractor at a mine than the assumption underlying Table 2.4.
The results using this alternative measure of contractor usage are presented in Table 2.6.
The results using this measure are actually stronger and larger than those presented in
Table 2.4. Particularly, the likelihood of a traumatic injury is 9% if a contractor is believed
to be present and the likelihood of any injury rises by 13%. Given the extreme assumption
we’ve imposed, this is a particularly striking result. When splitting the type of contract
work into categories, the risky tasks still have a high correlation with injury rates but so
does the "All Other" category. Although this measure is also not ideal, Table 2.6 results
indicate that the strong effects seen for the use of underground contracting is not an artifact
of how contractor utilization is captured.
Table 2.7 distinguishes contractor usage between mines where multiple contractors were
21Some contractors who received a violation but were not listed as working in an underground unit were
added to the universe. This is obviously not ideal but currently the best work around.
22The MSHA Part 50 Database indicates the entry and exit of contractors allowing us to use that data
for this identification purpose. For independent contractors that never receive a violation, there’s little we
can do to attach them to a mine.
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found to have violated multiple MSHA standards in a given quarter (3 or more contractors)
versus those with only 1 or 2 contractors with violations. The relevant comparison group
for both sets of regressions are mines that didn’t receive violations throughout the period.
The left set of columns in Table 2.7 indicate that in the quarter that a mine has a larger
number of contractors present at the mine, it is more likely to experience overall injuries,
traumatic injuries, and fatalities (although in the latter case the result is not significant).
In contrast, among mines with a small (1-2) number of contractors in use, there is little
difference in safety and health outcomes versus those who do not use contractors in that
period. When the alternative definition of contractor usage employed in Table 2.6 is applied
to the results, the results for the impact of contractors of either low or high use become
quite large and significant for fatality outcomes. However, the results for traumatic and
total injuries become insignificant for high contract users (Table 2.8).
2.4.2.4 Relation of operator violation behavior with contractor health and
safety outcomes
The final relationship we investigate is whether coal operators with histories of frequent
violations of MSHA standards raise the risk of injuries and fatalities when using contractors
relative to low violating operators who use contractors. The history of violation measure is
created using the number of significant and substantial (S&S) violations a mine has received
within the past year. An S&S violation is a violation that the inspector has determined is
reasonably likely to result in a fairly serious injury or illness. This definition has remained
constant throughout the period of analysis, meaning it wasn’t affected by the change in
citations that occurred with the 2006 MINER Act. Thus, it’s a consistent and accurate
measure of poor behavior on the part of the mine.
Before linking the history of violations to injury outcomes, it’s important to mention that
there exists a relationship between poorly behaved mines and the likelihood of receiving a
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contractor violation (see Table 2.9. There are two explanations for this, the first is that
poorly behaved mines are the most likely to hire contractors because they are bad actors
who are likely to use contractors to avoid liability. The other explanation is that because
mines receiving violations are under greater scrutiny, contractor utilization is more likely
to be observed. The positive correlation suggests that the contractor utilization measure
we’re using is upwardly biased, the question is to what extent.
Table 2.10 is an identical specification to that shown in Table 2.6 with the additional
explanatory variable of history of S&S violations for a mine.23 The mine’s history of viola-
tions increases the likelihood of injury and also decrease the contractor effect as expected
but it remains positive for all measures and significant for traumatic and total injuries.
The results also remain quite similar when broken out by type of contractor. Although
the selection and bias introduced by how we observe contractors does exist, we can at
least account for some of it and what remains is a positive relationship between contractor
utilization and poor outcomes for miners.
2.4.2.5 County-level Analysis
The original issue with the company-level approach was that we couldn’t discern which
mines a contractor was working at unless they received a citation at that mine. This issue
can be ameliorated by using data aggregated to a county level. We can infer which county
a contractor works in by mapping the business addresses of contractors to counties.24 A
number of other important statistics can be aggregated as well. The same injury counts are
used, just now on a county basis. Average seam height which is a good indicator of mine
size and geographic risk is calculated for each county. To ensure that the results aren’t
being driven by the number of mines or the size of production of a county, both of those
23This specification is assuming the robustness definition of whether or not a contractor is at a given
mine.
24The authors had the addresses of all the contractors geocoded by "geocoder.us". In instances where only
PO Boxes were provided, the city and zip code information was used to determine the county of location.
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covariates are also included. The implicit assumption in this analysis is that contractors
operate locally. There are certainly examples in the dataset of contractors in locations not
in the same county as an underground mining operation, but they generally appear to be
contractors doing more technical work.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.11. The IRR on the number of under-
ground contractors in a county is greater than 1 for all injury rates and either significant
or marginally insignificant, indicating a positive relationship between the number of un-
derground contractors and injury outcomes. The number of other types of contractors in a
county is positively correlated with the number of underground contractors but the effect
on injury rates is always smaller. We are also controlling for the size of the county, both
in terms of number of mines and production of mines. Thus it appears that even after
taking into account the relative supply of contractors and mines in a county, counties with
a higher number of underground contractors are also those with higher injury rates.
2.5 Conclusion
The growth of contractor utilization to undertake activities formerly core to business or-
ganizations apparent in other high risk industries is also on the rise in underground coal
mining. This fact in and of itself is not worrisome but this paper also documents the link
between this rise and differences across injury rates for independent contractors and mine
operators. More importantly, mines that use contractors appear to have higher levels of
injury rates and fatalities than those that do not.
This work highlights several important points from a policy perspective. The results imply
that organizational characteristics and relationships that are measurable may be associated
with higher injury and fatality rates. This has important implications for regulators because
it implies that organizational features not currently used for inspection targeting might be
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potentially useful in focusing inspection resources more effectively and, in turn, reducing
injuries and fatalities. It also highlights the need for a more systematic collection of the
complex contracting relationships in the mining industry on a quarterly basis. This is
particularly true in light of the current regulatory structure that uses refined measures of
operator past violation history as part of its enforcement mechanism, but may not pay
adequate attention to the nuances of relationships between operators and contractors in
implementing those policies in practice.
Expanding upon this last point, Buessing (2014) has shown that the 2006 MINER Act
had a significant effect on the ownership choices in the mining industry. Particularly, the
changes to the penalty structure influenced whether or not firms owned both a preparation
plant and a mine within a local market. The results suggest that in markets where the two
entities were integrated, firms were more likely to reduce the number of owner-operated
mines. If these mines were not closed but instead turned over to contract operators, this
could mean workers will be exposed to greater risk in the long run. Thus a next step in
this research is to find a way to systematically identify contract operations and determine
their true prevalence and relationship to worker outcomes.
2.6 Figures
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Figure 2.1: Trends in Operator and Independent Contractor Employment in Underground
Coal Mines, 1988 - 2010
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Figure 2.2: Traumatic and Fatality Injury Incidence Rates for Operators and Independent
Contractors of Underground Coal Mines, 1988-2010
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Figure 2.3: Employee Hours for Independent Contractors of Underground Coal Mines by
Type of Work, 1988-2010
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Injury and Mine Characterists Based on Contractor Uti-
lization
2000-2010
All Mines Received Contractor No Contractor
Violation Violations
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
IR Total Injuries 11.75 36.38 11.47 21.72 12.07 47.82
IR Traumatic Injuries 4.05 11.74 4.45 10.18 3.60 13.27
IR Fatalities 103.74 2843.35 98.68 2646.89 109.48 3050.82
Mine Size
Quarterly Short Tons of Coal 181,724 359,265 295,430 460,586 53,388 65,273
<20 Employees 0.29 0.45 0.16 0.37 0.44 0.50
20 to 500 Employees 0.70 0.46 0.82 0.38 0.56 0.50
>500 Employees 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00
Number of MMUs 1.85 1.47 2.41 1.76 1.21 0.55
Number of Mine Beds 1.02 0.14 1.03 0.17 1.01 0.10
Average Seam Thickness 50.23 23.24 54.87 25.20 44.99 19.53
Mine Characteristics
Mine Age in Quarters 23.72 26.20 31.16 29.93 15.32 17.82
Metallurgical Mine 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50
Number of Active Quarters 14 11 17 11 10 9
Union Status 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.23
Unique Mine Count 1,541 502 1,039
Observations 20,844 11,052 9,792
[1] The data source for this table is the publicly available MSHA mine level data. Each observation is a mine-quarter.
[2] A mine is considered to have received a contractor violation if at any point in time in the database a contractor
received a violation on its premises.
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Chapter 3
Identifying Contract Operations: A Case Study of
Ownership Choices in the Mining Industry
93
3.1 Introduction
How a firm chooses to allocate employment has important consequences for the health
and safety of workers. Weil (2014) discusses the use of these subcontracting arrangements
across a number of industries and shows the systematic negative effect these agreements
can have on worker outcomes. Evidence from high risk industries such as petrochemical,
construction and trucking indicate the negative effects associated with contracting out work
result from a desire by companies to avoid liability or regulatory oversight (Rebitzer, 1995;
Azari-Rad et al., 2003; James et al., 2007).
Contractor utilization in underground coal mining has experienced sustained growth over
the past 25 years. Some contractors are used in mining to undertake specialized tasks
in underground and above ground operations. Subcontracting of this variety provides for
gains in specialization to the operator and in terms of economic efficiency more broadly.
But contracting has also been used as a means of shifting liability for pension and health
obligations of union mine operators to other entities; to lower the cost of civil penalties
arising from violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act; and to avoid other employment
related costs. In addition, contracting can be a means of shifting legal liability to low
capitalized entities as a means of reducing costs associated with potential torts. When
contracting is used to pursue these ends, social costs can be significant.
One of the major issues in regulating these arrangements is that the arrangements are not
easily observable to an outside agency. Thus the true impact of these relationships is hard
to determine. This paper develops a method to measure prevalence of these arrangements
by using ownership information associated with those who hold the mineral rights. I look
at two companies, Massey Energy Company and Alpha Natural Resources, to validate and
explore the use of contract arrangements.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses where this paper fits within the
94
literature. Section 3.3 reviews the history of the two companies and the environmental
regulations I’m using to identify mineral ownership. Section 3.4 gives a brief description
of the data being used and shows the results of my analysis. I conclude with a discussion
of the broader implications of the results in Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature
The below graphic illustrates the different ownership arrangements that are made through-
out the supply chain of coal.
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The first tier of the figure highlights that who owns a mine can be very different from who
operates a mine. Mine ownership is determined by a complex set of ownership rights. Land
that’s owned by the government often times needs to be leased and private land and mineral
owners can also choose to lease out their rights. Other people choose to mine land and
minerals that they own. Additionally, transporting coal from mine elsewhere also typically
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requires ownership or payment to the entity that owns the transport network. The owner
of the mine, that is the entity that has the residual right of control in a Grossman and Hart
(1986) framework, is the firm that has the full bundle of ownership and leasing rights.
The relationship between the extraction process and electricity producers has been used to
understand the role asset specificity has in organizational choices. Joskow (1985) illustrated
that electricity producers with particularly large asset specific investments were more likely
to own their input mines or have long term contracts. Recent work by Kacker (2014)
examines how the Clean Air Act of 1990 affected the asset specific investments made
by electricity producers and shows this moved contracts toward shorter term, fixed price
contracts. These shift have also been driven by the rise in importance of preparation plants
in the industry.
Buessing (2014) focuses on this relationship by examining the binary choice of a prepa-
ration facilities to own a mine or not. This particular paper highlights that the liability
of ownership lead to a shedding of mines in markets that already had a minimum level of
integration when ownership costs rose with the implementation of the MINER Act. It also
showed that a modified supply assurance argument can explain integration in markets that
weren’t previously integrated.
But what’s missing in this literature that is shown in the diagram is what the contracting
arrangements look like at the mine level. Buessing and Weil (2013) look at the use of
independent contractor utilization within the mining industry and show a relationship
exists between these contracting arrangements and worker health and safety outcomes,
but note that contract operations can’t be measured. This is really the focus of this
paper. I ask how do ownership incentives of mineral rights allow us to identify contracting
arrangements in the industry and whether the use of these arrangements can be associated
with particular firm characteristics? This paper also examines health and safety as well
as productivity outcomes for Alpha and Massey to understand if the organizational choice
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relate to these economic outcomes.1
3.3 Industry Background
3.3.1 Company Histories
I examine two publicly traded firms during the 2003 to 2010 period that are similar in
terms of company size and production. Despite their similarities, these firms have chosen
considerably different paths in terms of mineral procurement, operations management and
distribution of the final product.
3.3.1.1 Alpha Natural Resources
Alpha Natural Resources was incorporated in November of 2004 but had been in operation
since 2002. It underwent two major acquisitions over the past decade. The first was
Foundation Coal which it bought out in 2009 and the second was Massey Energy Company
that it bought out in 2011. It has operations in Wyoming and Appalachia and produces
coal for electricity and metallurgical export. Even at its inception, it was the 5th largest
coal producer in the US. It sold 63.5 million tons of coal in 2004 and had 1.8 billion tons
of coal in probable reserve. In 2004 they had 13 mines and 4 processing plants, by 2010
they had 66 and had doubled their probably coal reserves as well as increased the number
of processing plants to 13. Their injury rates are low relative to the rest of the industry.
1A number of recent papers have shown strong productivity differences across ownership structures in
the airline, and automobile industries (Forbes and Lederman, 2010;Novak and Stern, 2008b).
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3.3.1.2 Massey Energy Company
Originally founded as a A.T. Massey in 1920, Massey Energy Company began as a coal
brokering business but by the 1940’s had expanded its operations to include coal operating
and processing. A majority interest in the company was bought by St Joe Mineral’s in
1974 and that company was acquired by Fluor Corporation in 1981. A.T. Massey was
a subsidiary of Fluor from 1987 until late 2000 which was when it separated from the
company and was renamed Massey Energy Company (?). Massey has operations predomi-
nately located in Central Appalachia. Over the period it has listed roughly 50 surface and
underground mines fulfilling domestic electricity and metallurgical export contracts and
was the fourth largest company in terms of profit in 2004. The company was bought by
Alpha Natural Resources in the beginning of 2011, shortly after one of Massey’s mines, the
Upper Big Branch Mine, suffered one of the largest mining disasters in recent history.
Massey has a history of using contract operations. A series of news articles run in the
Charleston Gazette on contract mining in the 1990s indicated that major mining compa-
nies used contract mining arrangements to avoid collective bargaining agreements (Nyden,
1993a; Nyden, 1993b; Nyden, 1993c; Nyden, 1993d). One article highlighted the Massey
Doctrine which stated Massey’s policy towards three types of mining situations: the com-
pany should control high quality coal with good mining conditions; for reserves that weren’t
as attractive they set up financial relations with operators to guarantee ’reasonably assured
profit but avoid mining risk’; and finally thin seamed mines that were hard to extract from
were given to contractors under a brokerage relationship (Nyden, 1993b). Beyond the fact
that these contract mines have been used previously to avoid pension payments, contract
mining operations are also often small and undercapitalized. Many times they are required
to sell their output to the controlling entity that is leasing out the mining rights.
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3.3.2 Licensing Rules
As discussed in the industry supply chain, the owner or leaser of the mineral rights has the
residual rights of control of the mine. As a result, the firm that owns this is likely the entity
choosing to contract out the operation or operate it on its own. Although determining who
owns the mineral rights is complicated, the entity that typically has ownership or is leasing
the mineral rights is also the company putting up a reclamation bond. A reclamation bond
is meant to cover the environmental costs associated with a mine should the operation not
properly clean up the site when it shuts down.2 The reclamation bond is typically quite
costly but is necessary before any extraction can take place, thus it’s typically associated
with the company that also owns the right to mine.
Typically a firm that owns the mineral rights can lease the bundle of rights to an indepen-
dent operation. Sometimes this arrangement is just that and the licensing company gets
a rent for bundling the licenses and taking the risk of the upfront capital investment. But
other times, the company that owns the mineral rights allows another company to extract
the coal on the condition that company sells the coal to one of its processing facilities. This
arrangement holds the extracting company captive to the owner of the mineral rights and
if this scenario is being used to avoid regulatory avoidance, then there may be negative
effects for worker outcomes.3
3.4 Data
• MSHA Open Government Initiative Data: MSHA collects extensive data at the
mine level on every inspection, citation and reported injury as well as employment
2Reclamation bonds were part of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)
which was enacted in response to concerns over the environmental effects of strip mining.
3Much of this information comes from an interview of Earl Bandy of the Office of Surface Mining (OSM).
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and production for each mine.4 5 The investigators also have obtained complete
administrative records on changes in mine and facility operation statuses, as well as
changes to controllers and operators going back in some cases to the late 70’s.6
• Applicant/Violator Computer System (AVS): The AVS data comes from the
Office of Surface Mining (OSM). This data include all approved permits for surface
operations that either expire or are issued between 2000 and 2010.7 The data include
information on the permit holder, the mine that the permit is for and the operator of
that mine and ideally whether or not the mine is an owner operated site or a contract
operation.
Although MSHA data trace company information over time and keep track of the parent
company of subsidiaries, the reclamation permits don’t consistently link a subsidiary back
to its final controlling entity nor does it link easily to the MSHA database. For example,
neither Alpha Natural Resources nor Massey Energy Company appear in the list of permit
holders. Thus, the list of all their subsidiaries has to be compiled and merged in with the
list of permit holders to determine which permits are in fact held by either company.8 Once
the company information is standardized, the bond payment information can be linked to
the operations covered by the permit.9. Mines are flagged as contract operations where the
controlling entity for a bond holder differs from that of the mine operator.
4Injury counts for contractors across the two datasets match except for 8 cases, which are small in terms
of the size of the discrepancy.
5The specific datasets used are the following: "Accident Injuries Data Set", "Employment/Production
Data Set (Quarterly)", "Inspections Data Set", "Mine Addresses of Record Data Set", and "Violations Data
Set."
6The Open Government Initiative data can be obtained at:
http://www.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/OGIMSHA.asp.
MSHA has provided historic administrative records required to determine operation and ownership histories
to the authors.
7Although the permit is for surface operations, all underground mines have to get at least some level
of surface permitting to deal with the above ground presence, ie. transportation of the coal, storage and
equipment
8The author compiled the list of all subsidiaries for both companies from Exhibit 21.1 of the companies’
10-K filings over the period 2003-2010. For a full list see Table 3.4.
9This is straightforward for most permits, but some are missing MSHA ID’s and as a result have been
left out of the analysis
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3.5 Comparison of Outcomes
3.5.1 Ownership Choices
The companies, despite being of similar size and valuation, have considerably different
ownership practices. Massey is known for utilizing contract operations. Although Nyden’s
articles showed this was standard practice for Massey during the 1990’s, very little has
been systematically done to determine the actual prevalence of contract operations in the
mining industry and how prevalent it has been in more recent history.
Using the reclamation data, I back out the prevalence of operations where the complex set of
licensing and permitting is held by one of these large companies but the operating company
is not a subsidiary or Alpha or Massey. This type of arrangement is likely indicative of
a contracting arrangement. Out of the 221 permits held by an Alpha subsidiary, 102 of
them were always run by an Alpha subsidiary whereas Massey had 92 unique permits with
only 20 of them belonging to a Massey run operation the entire time.10 The difference
in contractor utilization is statistically significant and if this measure is correct it appears
that as many industry experts have suggested, Massey used this arrangement much more
often than its competitors.
A major difference across the companies is how they refer to their operations in their Annual
Report (?). Alpha discusses each of its mining operations similarly to Massey as an area
centered around a preparation facility and load out system. But it also mentions how many
of the input mines are owned by the company and how many are independent contractors.
As a result, this allows me to another way to check the validity of this contract operation
algorithm. For illustrative purposed I focus on the year 2005 because it is prior to Sago
mining disaster and subsequent MINER Act which I’ve shown to affect ownership choices.
10Alpha and Massey have held considerably more permits than those listed above during the study period
but they don’t have an operator listed meaning they were not yet active operations.
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I focus on the Paramont mining complex in Virginia. The complex has nine underground
operations, two of which are contract operations and five surface operations, three of which
are contracting arrangements. All five surface operations have corresponding permits in the
AVS database and the algorithm I have finds four contract operations rather than three,
so it appears to overstate the number of contractors. Unfortunately, it appears that not all
the underground operations have corresponding SMCRA permits. Three of the nine active
underground mines did, but all of them are selected as contractors based on the algorithm.
Thus it appears that this measure is a slightly inflated measure of contractor utilization
but does tend to capture the general trend in the industry.
Another check on this methodology was to compare my contractor flag to the contractor
indicator available in the AVS data to see how well the two variables coincide. The AVS
indicator tells a considerably different story. First the magnitude of contractor utilization
indicated by the flag is very small, roughly 9% for Alpha and 3% for Massey. The overlap
between this variable and the one I created also tells an interesting story. Every operation
flagged by OSM as a contract operation for Alpha is also picked up by my algorithm, that
is the 9% are all included in my contract arrangement variable. The same cannot be said
for Massey. 3 of the 8 companies that are considered contractors by OSM are clearly run
by Massey subsidiaries in the permitting data. But interestingly, mine ID 4407151 has a
different controller listed for the Massey subsidiary than Massey in the MSHA database.
Clearly there are some discrepancies and misreporting across the two databases. That
being said, it’s obvious this AVS measure is capturing some but certainly not the totality
of all contract operations in the US.
3.5.2 Labor Outcomes
The first obvious measure that indicates there are large differences in worker outcomes
across these firms comes from MSHA’s citation data. Citations are given for infractions
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of MSHA’s civil code. To control for size differences across mines, all citation measures
are divided by 100 inspector hours. Table 3.1 shows that Massey has statistically higher
violation rates across all four measures. The overall citation measure is more easily ex-
plained by mine characteristics such as mine size and seam height but the other measures
don’t suffer this bias as much. Particularly orders and significant and substantial (S&S)
violations are citations that are only handed out when there is flagrant disregard for worker
safety. Looking at the contested citations, it appears that Massey is also more likely to
fight their violations. The rate at which they do so is much greater than the rate with
which they receive these citations as compared to Alpha.
Another important measure is the injury rates across the two companies, particularly in
underground operations. These measures are provided in Table 3.2. Across every measure,
even the total injury measure which can be prone to reporting bias, Alpha has considerably
lower injury rate levels. When I remove the Upper Big Branch incident, this remains true
except for the fatality rate. But overall, it’s quite striking the safety difference between
these two companies.
To further drive this point home, I examined the violation and injury rates for Massey
owned mines pre and post the acquisition and report these results in Table 3.3. Although
there are a number of issues with this set-up what is striking is the difference across these
measures under different ownership. I use 2009 as the pre period to avoid including injuries
and citations associated with the Upper Big Branch disaster and 2011 as the post period.
The fatality injury measure isn’t significantly different which isn’t surprising given the
small observation count of fatalities. The total injury rate goes up, but as discussed earlier
this is a measure that can be manipulated. Given the traumatic injury measure goes down
following the acquisition, the increase in total injury suggests Massey was under reporting
its injury measures.
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3.5.3 Productivity Outcomes
Table 3.1 illustrates that productivity differences across the two firms is minimal for un-
derground operations, but quite large for surface. This is mostly due to the nature of the
surface industries owned by the two companies. Alpha has a large operation in Wyoming
which uses drag line technology to extract coal. This method is particularly productive
but isn’t feasible to use in Appalachian surface mines.
Table 3.3 provides similar statistics but for Massey mines that switched ownership. These
results show that productivity in surface mines is statistically indistinguishable prior to
and following the acquisition. However, this is not the case for underground mines and
their productivity decreases substantially. There are a few potential explanations for this
result.
Of the 125 mines that were owned by Massey in 2009, 111 of them were in the database
and acquired by Alpha in 2011. One would expect Alpha to keep open the more productive
operations, so it’s counterintuitive to a selection story to see a decrease in productivity.
Another potential explanation is that Alpha is just much less efficient, but this too seems
unlikely as the productivity for Massey mines run by Alpha is much lower than the pro-
ductivity for the average Alpha mine. It’s possible that a combination of the two stories
is driving the result. That is, most mines owned by Alpha are larger operations and thus
they don’t know how to effectively extract coal from smaller, underground operation.
Although this is a plausible story it is the less likely when the citation difference is taken into
consideration. All citation measures dropped dramatically following the Alpha acquisition,
consistent with a shift in compliance. Also, the similarity in the productivity of surface
mines where complying with health and safety standards isn’t as costly further suggests
that Massey was not paying the full price of operating by failing to maintain a safe work
environment for its employees.
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3.6 Conclusion
This case study, although anecdotal in nature, is meant to illustrate the complexities of
ownership choices in the coal mining industry. Contract theory indicates that contracting
makes sense when the cost of ownership is high, but what if these arrangements are put
in place so that an obvious connection between two companies doesn’t exist. That is,
contracting arrangements aren’t being used to achieve efficient outcomes but to avoid
liability.
There are large differences in worker outcomes and productivity across these two firms
when looking at subsidiaries and firms that are clearly connected. If these differences exist
for Massey entities it is willing to associate with, it raises cause for concern over the type
of outcomes for entities they control implicitly but avoid owning over liability concerns.
This chapter takes a first step in developing an algorithm to determine contract operations
in the US. This methodology appears to have captured an upper bound on the number
of contract operations in existence. It also reveals that the AVS data does not provide a
perfect measure of mineral ownership. Thus, a state-by-state analysis with more detailed
data on mineral and reclamations rights will be necessary for scaling up this identification
strategy.
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Table 3.4: List of Subsidiaries for 2003-2010
Alpha Natural Resources Massey Energy Company
ALLIANCE POWER MARKETING INC A T MASSEY COAL COMPANY INC
ALPHA AMERICAN COAL COMPANY LLC ALEX ENERGY INC
ALPHA AMERICAN COAL HOLDING LLC ALLBURN COAL COMPANY
ALPHA AUSTRALIA LLC ALLIANCE COAL CORPORATION
ALPHA AUSTRALIA SERVICES LLC ANNA BRANCH MINING COMPANY
ALPHA COAL RESOURCES COMPANY LLC APPALACHIAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORP
ALPHA COAL SALES CO LLC APPALACHIAN SYNFUEL LLC
ALPHA COAL WEST INC ARACOMA COAL COMPANY INC
ALPHA ENERGY SALES LLC ATLAS PROCESSING COMPANY
ALPHA INDIA LLC BANDMILL COAL CORPORATION
ALPHA LAND AND RESERVES LLC BANDYTOWN COAL COMPANY
ALPHA MIDWEST HOLDING COMPANY BARNABUS LAND COMPANY
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES CAPITAL CORP BELFRY COAL CORPORATION
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES INC BEN CREEK COAL COMPANY
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL LLC BIG BEAR MINING COMPANY
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES LLC BIG BOTTOM COAL COMPANY
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES SERVICES LLC BIG ELK MINING COMPANY
ALPHA PA COAL TERMINAL LLC BIG LAUREL MINING CORPORATION
ALPHA SHALE HOLDINGS LLC BIG M TRANSPORT
ALPHA SHALE RESOURCES LP BIG SANDY VENTURE CAPITAL CORP
ALPHA SHIPPING AND CHARTERING LLC BLACK CASTLE MINING COMPANY
ALPHA SUB FIVE LLC BLACK KING MINE DEVELOPMENT CO
ALPHA SUB FOUR LLC BLACK KNIGHT MINING COMPANY
ALPHA SUB ONE LLC BLACK MOUNTAIN RESOURCES LLC
ALPHA SUB THREE LLC BLACKBERRY CREEK COAL COMPANY
ALPHA SUB TWO LLC BLUE RIDGE VENTURE CAPITAL CORP
ALPHA TERMINAL COMPANY LLC BLUESPRINGS COAL COMPANY
ALPHA WYOMING LAND COMPANY LLC BLUFF SPUR COAL CORPORATION
AMFIRE HOLDINGS INC BOONE EAST DEVELOPMENT CO
AMFIRE LLC BOONE ENERGY COMPANY
AMFIRE MINING COMPANY LLC BOONE WEST DEVELOPMENT CO
AMFIRE WV LP BULL MOUNTAIN MINING CORPORATION
ANR RECEIVABLES FUNDING LLC BURNWELL ENERGY COMPANY
AXIOM EXCAVATING AND GRADING SERVICES LLC CABINAWA MINING COMPANY
BARBARA HOLDINGS INC CALLOWAY MINING COMPANY
BLACK DOG COAL CORP CAPSTAN MINING COMPANY
BROOKS RUN MINING COMPANY LLC CAVE SPUR COAL LLC
BUCHANAN ENERGY COMPANY LLC CENTRAL PENN ENERGY COMPANY INC
CALLAWAY LAND AND RESERVES LLC CENTRAL WEST VIRGINIA ENERGY COMPANY
CASTLE GATE HOLDING COMPANY CERES LAND COMPANY
COAL GAS RECOVERY LP CLEAN ENERGY MINING COMPANY
COBRA NATURAL RESOURCES LLC CLEAR FORK COAL COMPANY
CORAL ENERGY SERVICES LLC CLOVERLICK COAL COMPANY LLC
CORRAL CREEK HOLDING LLC CLOVERLICK MANAGEMENT LLC
CUMBERLAND COAL RESOURCES LP COAL HANDLING FACILITY INC
DELTA MINE HOLDING COMPANY COAL HANDLING SOLUTIONS
DICKENSON-RUSSELL COAL COMPANY LLC COAL MINING SUPPORT COMPANY
DICKENSON-RUSSELL LAND AND RESERVES LLC COALGOOD ENERGY COMPANY
DOMINION TERMINAL ASSOCIATES COALSOLV LLC
DRY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES INC CONTINUITY VENTURE CAPITAL CORP
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
Alpha Natural Resources Massey Energy Company
EMERALD COAL RESOURCES LP COVINGTON HANDLING LLC
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION CUMBERLAND EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
ENTERPRISE LAND AND RESERVES INC CUMBERLAND RESOURCES CORPORATION
ENTERPRISE MINING COMPANY LLC DEHUE COAL COMPANY
ESPERANZA COAL CO LLC DELBARTON MINING COMPANY
EXCELVEN PTY LTD DEMETER LAND COMPANY
FC 2 CORP DIAMOND ENERGY MINING COMPANY
FOUNDATION AMERICAN COAL COMPANY LLC DORCHESTER ASSOCIATES LLC
FOUNDATION AMERICAN COAL HOLDING LLC DORCHESTER ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED
FOUNDATION COAL CORPORATION DOUGLAS POCAHONTAS COAL CORPORATION
FOUNDATION COAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION DRIH CORPORATION
FOUNDATION COAL RESOURCES CORPORATION DUCHESS COAL COMPANY
FOUNDATION COAL WEST INC DUNCAN FORK COAL COMPANY
FOUNDATION ENERGY SALES INC EAGLE ENERGY INC
FOUNDATION EQUIPMENT COMPANY EDWIGHT MINING COMPANY
FOUNDATION MIDWEST HOLDING COMPANY ELK RUN COAL COMPANY INC
FOUNDATION MINING LP EN ROUTE LLC
FOUNDATION PA COAL COMPANY LLC ENDURANCE MINING COMPANY
FOUNDATION PA COAL TERMINAL LLC ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES INC
FOUNDATION ROYALTY COMPANY ENERGY TRANSPORT COMPANY
FOUNDATION WYOMING LAND COMPANY EXETER COAL CORPORATION
FREEPORT MINING LP EXTRA ENERGY COMPANY
FREEPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION FEATS VENTURE CAPITAL CORP
HERNDON PROCESSING COMPANY LLC FOGLESONG ENERGY COMPANY
KEPLER PROCESSING COMPANY LLC FOOTHILLS COAL COMPANY
KINGSTON MINING INC FREEDOM ENERGY MINING COMPANY
KINGSTON PROCESSING INC GOALS COAL COMPANY
KINGSTON RESOURCES INC GRAY HAWK INSURANCE COMPANY
KINGWOOD MINING COMPANY LLC GREEN VALLEY COAL COMPANY
LAUREL CREEK CO INC GREYEAGLE COAL COMPANY
LITWAR PROCESSING COMPANY LLC GUEST MOUNTAIN MINING CORPORATION
MAPLE MEADOW MINING COMPANY GUYANDOTTE ENERGY
MAXXIM REBUILD CO LLC HADEN FARMS INC
MAXXIM SHARED SERVICES LLC HANNA LAND COMPANY LLC
MAXXUM CARBON RESOURCES LLC HARLAN RECLAMATION SERVICES LLC
MCDOWELL-WYOMING COAL COMPANY LLC HARLAN RESOURCES LLC
MOUNTAIN MERGER SUB INC HAZY RIDGE COAL COMPANY
NEWEAGLE COAL SALES CORP HIGH SPLINT COAL LLC
NEWEAGLE DEVELOPMENT CORP HIGHLAND MINING COMPANY
NEWEAGLE INDUSTRIES INC HOMER III PROCESSING COMPANY
NEWEAGLE MINING CORP HOPKINS CREEK COAL COMPANY
NICEWONDER CONTRACTING INC INDEPENDENCE COAL COMPANY INC
ODELL PROCESSING INC INMAN COAL
PALLADIAN HOLDINGS LLC INTREPID MINING COMPANY
PALLADIAN LIME LLC JACKS BRANCH COAL COMPANY
PARAMONT COAL COMPANY VIRGINIA LLC JOBONER COAL COMPANY
PAYNTER BRANCH MINING INC JST LAND COMPANY
PENNSYLVANIA LAND HOLDINGS CORPORATION JST MINING COMPANY
PENNSYLVANIA SERVICES CORPORATION JST RESOURCES LLC
PIONEER FUEL CORPORATION KANAWHA ENERGY COMPANY
PIONEER MINING INC KINGSPORT HANDLING LLC
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
Alpha Natural Resources Massey Energy Company
PLATEAU MINING CORPORATION KINGSPORT SERVICES LLC
PREMIUM ENERGY LLC KNOX CREEK COAL CORPORATION
RED ASH SALES COMPANY INC LAUREN LAND COMPANY
RIVER PROCESSING CORPORATION LAXARE INC
RIVEREAGLE CORP LICK BRANCH COAL COMPANY
RIVERSIDE ENERGY COMPANY LLC LOBATA COAL COMPANY
RIVERTON CAPITAL VENTURES I LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LOGAN COUNTY MINE SERVICES INC
RIVERTON CAPITAL VENTURES II LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LONG FORK COAL COMPANY
RIVERTON COAL PRODUCTION INC LONG POLE ENERGY
RIVERTON COAL SALES INC LOVE BRANCH SOUTH
ROCKSPRING DEVELOPMENT INC LYNCO MINING COMPANY
RUHRKOHLE TRADING CORPORATION LYNN BRANCH COAL COMPANY INC
SIMMONS FORK MINING INC M & B COAL COMPANY
SOLOMONS MINING COMPANY M T R MINING COMPANY
SOUTHERN RESOURCES INC M3 ENERGY MINING COMPANY
TARGET DRILLING INC MAGGARD BRANCH COAL LLC
TWIN STAR MINING INC MAGNOLIA COAL COMPANY
TWISTED GUN LLC MAJESTIC MINING INC
VIRGINIA ENERGY COMPANY LLC MAMMOTH COAL COMPANY
WABASH MINE HOLDING COMPANY MARFORK COAL COMPANY INC
WARRICK HOLDING COMPANY MARTIN COUNTY COAL CORPORATION
WHITE FLAME ENERGY INC MASS TRANSPORT COMPANY
WYOMING QUALITY HEALTHCARE COALITION LLC MASSEY COAL EXPORT COMPANY
MASSEY COAL SALES COMPANY INC
MASSEY COAL SERVICES INC
MASSEY EUROPEAN SALES INC
MASSEY GAS & OIL COMPANY
MASSEY INDUSTRIAL SALES COMPANY
MASSEY METALLURGICAL COAL INC
MASSEY NEW ERA CAPITAL CORP
MASSEY TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS INC
MASSEY UTILITY & INDUSTRIAL SALES
MASSEY UTILITY SALES COMPANY
MAXANN COAL CORP
MAYSVILLE HANDLING LLC
MEADOW BRANCH COAL LLC
MEADOW BRANCH MINING CORPORATION
MENEFEE LAND COMPANY INC
MILL BRANCH COAL CORPORATION
MINE MAINTENANCE INC
MINING SUPPORT GROUP
MOUNTAIN MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED
MOUNTAINEER CAPITAL II LP
MOUNTAINEER CAPITAL LP
NAOMA COAL COMPANY
NEW MARKET LAND COMPANY
NEW MASSEY CAPITAL CORP
NEW RIDGE MINING COMPANY
NEW RIVER CAPITAL COMPANY
NEW RIVER ENERGY CORPORATION
NEW RIVER WELL SERVICES
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
Alpha Natural Resources Massey Energy Company
NICCO CORPORATION
NICHOLAS ENERGY COMPANY
NINE MILE SPUR LLC
NORTH FORK COAL CORPORATION
NORTH SURFACE MINE
OMAR MINING COMPANY
ORA MAE COAL COMPANY
OSAKA MINING CORPORATION
P M CHARLES COAL CO
PANTHER MINING LLC
PEERLESS EAGLE COAL CO
PEGS BRANCH ENERGY MINING COMPANY
PEGS BRANCH MINING COMPANY
PERFORMANCE COAL COMPANY
PETER CAVE MINING COMPANY
PIGEON CREEK PROCESSING CORPORATION
PIKCO MINING COMPANY
PILGRIM MINING COMPANY INC
PINEY CREEK COAL COMPANY
POCA 3
POND CREEK MINING CO
POWELL RIVER RESOURCES CORPORATION
POWER MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY
PP&M COMPANY
PROCESS ENERGY
PROCESSING MAINTENANCE GROUP
PROGRESS COAL COMPANY
PROGRESSIVE VENTURE CAPITAL CORP
RAVEN RESOURCES INC
RAWL SALES & PROCESSING CO
RAWL SALES VENTURE CAPITAL CORP
REPUBLIC ENERGY
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT LLC
RESOURCE ENERGY COMPANY
RESOURCE LAND COMPANY LLC
ROAD FORK DEVELOPMENT COMPANY INC
ROBINSON-PHILLIPS COAL COMPANY
ROCKHOUSE ENERGY MINING COMPANY
ROCKRIDGE COAL COMPANY
ROCKY HOLLOW COAL CO
RODA RESOURCES LLC
ROSTRAVER ENERGY COMPANY
RUM CREEK COAL SALES INC
RUM CREEK SYNFUEL COMPANY
RUSSELL FORK COAL COMPANY
SC COAL CORPORATION
SCARLET LAND COMPANY
SHANNON-POCAHONTAS COAL CORPORATION
SHANNON-POCAHONTAS MINING COMPANY
SHEEP FORK MINING COMPANY
SHENANDOAH CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORP
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
Alpha Natural Resources Massey Energy Company
SIDNEY COAL COMPANY INC
SIMRON FUEL CO
SOLID ENERGY MINING COMPANY
SPARTAN MINING COMPANY
SPM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORP
SPRING BRANCH MINING COMPANY
SPROUSE CREEK PROCESSING COMPANY
ST ALBAN’S CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORP
STILLHOUSE MINING LLC
STIRRAT COAL COMPANY
STONE MINING COMPANY
SUN COAL COMPANY INC
SUPERIOR SURFACE MINE
SUPPORT MINING COMPANY
SYCAMORE FUELS INC
SYCAMORE MINING CO
TALL TIMBER COAL COMPANY
TALON LOADOUT COMPANY
TCH COAL CO
TENNESSEE CONSOLIDATED COAL COMPANY
TENNESSEE ENERGY CORP
THE LYNNBARK LAND COMPANY
THUNDER MINING COMPANY
TOWN CREEK COAL COMPANY
TRACE CREEK COAL COMPANY
TRACE TRANSPORT COMPANY
TRAIL MINING COMPANY
TUCSON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
UPPER BIG BRANCH MINING COMPANY
VANTAGE MINING COMPANY
VICTORY ENERGY MINING COMPANY
VICTORY PROCESSING COMPANY
WHITE BUCK COAL COMPANY
WILLIAMS MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY
WINIFREDE COAL CORPORATION
WINSTON COAL COMPANY
WYOMAC COAL COMPANY INC
[1] Information from Alpha Natural Resources’ 10-K filings 2007-2010.
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Mitton, T. (2009). Determinants of vertical integration:
financial development and contracting costs. The Journal of Finance, LXIV(3):1251–
1290.
Alfaro, L., Conconi, P., Fadinger, H., and Newman, A. F. (2013). Do Prices Determine
Vertical Integration ? Evidence from Trade Policy. Working Paper.
Alpha (2008). Annual Report 2007.
Arlen, J. and MacLeod, W. B. (2005). Beyond master-servant: A critique of vicarious lia-
bility. In Madden, S., editor, Exploring Tort Law, pages 111–142. Cambridge University
Press, New York.
Atack, J., Bateman, F., Haines, M., and Margo, R. a. (2010). Did Railroads Induce
or Follow Economic Growth?: Urbanization and Population Growth in the American
Midwest, 1850-1860. Social Science History, 34(2):171–197.
Azari-Rad, H., Philips, P., and Thompson-Dawson, W. (2003). Subcontracting and injury
rates in construction. The Industrial Relations Research Association Proceedings 2003,
pages 241–248.
Baker, G. and Hubbard, T. (2004). Contractibility and asset ownership: On-board comput-
ers and governance in US trucking. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4):1443–
1479.
Baker, G. P. and Hubbard, T. N. (2003). Make Versus Buy in Trucking : Asset Ownership,
Job Design, and Information. The American Economic Review, 93(3):551–572.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1):249–
275.
Bolton, P. and Whinston, M. D. (1993). Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration and
Supply Assurance. The Review of Economic Studies, 60(1):121–148.
Buessing, M. (2014). Vertical Integration and Regulation in US Coal. Working Paper,
pages 1–53.
Buessing, M. and Weil, D. (2013). Impact of Contracting on Occupational Injuries and
Fatalities in Underground Coal Mining. Working Paper, pages 1–32.
115
Chamblin, H. D. (2002). Small Mammal Communities on a Reclaimed Mountaintop
Mine/Valle Fill Landscape in Southern West Virginia. PhD thesis, West Virginia Uni-
versity.
Crandall, G., Starrett, S., and Parker, D. (1998). Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil: Em-
ployer Abuse of the Corporate Form to Avoid or Deny Workers’ Collectively Bargained
and Statutory Rights. West Virginia Law Review, 100:537–599.
Ellerman, A. D., Joskow, P. L., Schmalensee, R., Montero, J.-P., and Bailey, E. (2000).
Markets for Clean Air: The US Acid Rain Program. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Fiscor, S. (2005). Prep plant population rebounds. Coal Age, 110(10).
Fishback, P. (2007). Seeking Security in the Postwar Era. In Fishback, P., editor, Govern-
ment and the American Economy: A New History, pages 507–518. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Fishback, P. and Kantor, S. (2001). Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers’
Compensation. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Forbes, S. J. and Lederman, M. (2009). Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline
Industry. American Economic Review, 99(5):1831–1849.
Forbes, S. J. and Lederman, M. (2010). Does vertical integration affect firm performance?
Evidence from the airline industry. The RAND Journal of Economics, 41(4):765–790.
Fulton, M. M. (2007). The Impact of New Civil Penalties on Your Bottom Line. Coal Age,
112(11):48–48.
Gibbons, R. (2005). Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? Journal of Economic Behav-
ior & Organization, 58(2):200–245.
Gray, W. and Jones, C. (1991). Are OSHA health inspections effective? A longitudinal
study in the manufacturing sector. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(3):504–
508.
Gray, W. and Scholz, J. (1993). Does regulatory enforcement work? A panel analysis of
OSHA enforcement. Law and Society Review, 27(1):177–214.
Gray, W. B. and Mendeloff, J. M. (2005). The Declining Effects of OSHA Inspections on
Manufacturing Injuries , 1979 to 1998. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 58(4):571–
587.
Gray, W. B. and Shimshack, J. P. (2011). The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitor-
ing and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy, 5(1):3–24.
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4):691–719.
116
Hart, O. and Holmstrom, B. (2010). A theory of firm scope. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 125(2):483–513.
Hendrix, R. B. (2011). MSHA’s Proposed POV Rule. Aggregates Manager, (March):54–56.
Holmstrom, B. and Kaplan, S. N. (2001). Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the
United States : Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
15(2):121–144.
Hortaçsu, A. and Syverson, C. (2007). Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration,
Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2):250–301.
Hubbard, T. N. (2001). Contractual form and market thickness in trucking. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 32(2):369–386.
James, P., Johnstone, R., Quinlan, M., and Walters, D. (2007). Regulating Supply Chains
to Improve Health and Safety. Industrial Law Journal, 36(2):163–187.
Joskow, P. (1985). Vertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coal-burning
electric generating plants. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1(1):33–80.
Kacker, K. (2014). Regulation and Contract Design: The Impact of Relationship Spe-cific
Investment. Working Paper, pages 1–49.
Kary, T. (2013). Patriot Coal Wins Leave to Cut Retiree Pensions, Benefits. Bloomberg,
pages 1–3.
Kary, T. and Elmquist, S. (2012). Patriot Coal Retirees May Seek Claims on Peabody,
Arch. Bloomberg, pages 1–4.
KGS (2006). Methods of Mining. Kentucky Geological Survey,
(http://www.uky.edu/KGS/coal/coal_mining.htm Accessed September 30, 2013).
Kochan, T., Smith, M., Wells, J., and Rebitzer, J. (1991). Managing the safety of contingent
workers: a study of contract workers in the petrochemical industry. Technical report,
The John Gray Institute, Lamar University, Washinton, D.C.
Lafontaine, F. and Slade, M. (2007). Vertical integration and firm boundaries: the evidence.
Journal of Economic Literature, XLV(September):629–685.
Legros, P. and Newman, A. (2008). Competing for ownership. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 6(6):1279–1308.
Legros, P. and Newman, A. F. (2013). A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2):725–770.
Lipton, E. (2012). Even in Coal Country, the Fight for an Industry. New York Times.
Loeb, P. (1997). Shear madness. US News and World Report.
117
McLaren, J. (2000). "Globalization" and vertical structure. American Economic Review,
90(5):1239–1254.
Morantz, A. (2013). Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference? Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 66(1):88–116.
MSHA (2007). Research Report on Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines.
Technical report, MSHA.
NAS (2007). Coal: Research and Development to Support National Energy Policy. The
National Academies Press, Washinton, D.C.
NIOSH (2007). Cost Analysis of Portable Refuge Chambers. Technical report, NIOSH.
Novak, S. and Stern, S. (2008a). Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions:
Evidence from Automobile Product Development. Management Science, 55(2):311–332.
Novak, S. and Stern, S. (2008b). How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics?
Evidence from the Automobile Industry. Management Science, 54(12):1963–1979.
Nyden, P. (1993a). Coal Contracts: Shifting Mining Danger, Responsibility. The
Charlestown Sunday Gazette-Mail.
Nyden, P. (1993b). Massey Contracting Made Contraversy. The Charlestown Gazette.
Nyden, P. (1993c). Mining Contractors Owe Millions in Fees, Fines, Wages. The
Charlestown Sunday Gazette-Mail.
Nyden, P. (1993d). Small Mines Shunt Safety Concerns for Large Profits. The Charlestown
Sunday Gazette-Mail.
Perlmutter, W. B. (2008). When Everything Changed : Civil Penalties Under The Miner
Act and The New Part 100. Mining Law Monitor, 24(1):8–12.
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books,
New York.
Rebitzer, J. B. (1995). Job Safety and Contract Workers in the Petrochemical Industry.
Industrial Relations, 34(1):40–57.
Rey, P. and Tirole, J. (2007). A primer on foreclosure. Handbook of industrial organization,
3(06):2147–2215.
Rodrigue, J. P., Comtois, C., and Slack, B. (2009). The Geography of Transport Systems.
Taylor & Francis.
Shimshack, J. P. and Ward, M. B. (2008). Enforcement and over-compliance. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 55(1):90–105.
Stoker, T. M., Berndt, E. R., Ellerman, D. A., and Schennach, S. M. (2005). Panel data
analysis of U.S. coal productivity. Journal of Econometrics, 127(2):131–164.
118
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
volume 1 edition.
U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1990). Phillips
66 Company Houston Chemical Complex Explosion and Fire: Implications for Safety
and Health in the Petrochemical Industry. Technical Report April, Government Printing
Office, Washinton, D.C.
US Energy Information Administration (2013). Energy in Brief: What is the role of coal
in the United States ? Technical report, Washinton, D.C.
Weil, D. (1996). If OSHA is so bad, why is compliance so good? The RAND Journal of
Economics, 27(3):618–640.
Weil, D. (2014). The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and
What Can Be Done to Improve It. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wright, G. (1990). The origins of American industrial success, 1879-1940. The American
Economic Review, 80(4):651–668.
Curriculum Vitae
Contact Marric G. Buessing
Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Rd., Boston,
MA 02215, USA
Education Boston University, B.A., Summa Cum Laude Economics and Interna-
tional Relations (With Distinction – Dean’s List), September 2001 – May
2005.
Boston University PhD candidate, September 2009 – present. Thesis
advisor: Andrew Newman.
1.Publications Marric Buessing and Mauricio Soto, The State Of Private Pensions: Cur-
rent 5500 Data. Center for Retirement Research. Issues in Brief ib42
(2006), 1-4.
2. Alicia Munnell, Marric Buessing, Mauricio Soto, and Steven Sass, Will
We Have To Work Forever. Center for Retirement Research. Work Op-
portunity Briefs wob4 (2006), 1-8.
1.Fellowships
and Awards
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, 2012 and 2013
2. Summer Research Grant, Boston University, 2011 and 2013
3. NIOSH Pilot Project Research Training Grant, Harvard School of Public
Health, 2011
4. Honorable Mention, NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, 2009
1.Teaching
Experience
Teaching Fellow, Empirical Economics 1 and 2, Department of Economics,
Boston University, Spring 2013
2. Instructor, Economics of Lesser Developed Regions, Department of Eco-
nomics, Boston University, Summer 2012.
3. Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of
Economics, Boston University, Spring 2011
4. Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of
Economics, Boston University, Fall 2010
